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I. INTRODUCTION
The American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct' ("Code")
provides direction on the manner in which judges should conduct
themselves.2 Most states either have adopted the 1990 Code3 or have
retained the 1972 Code. Depending upon the language chosen by each
state, the Code's Canons may be rules to be enforced, or they may be
aspirational in character.4
1. In 1924, the American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted 34 Canons of
Judicial Ethics. During the next 50 years, a majority adopted the Canons either verbatim or
in an amended version. In 1969, the President of the American Bar Association appointed
California Chief Justice Roger Traynor to chair a Special Committee on Standards of Judicial
Conduct to reexamine the Canons. The Committee spent three years reorganizing, revising,
and rewriting the Canons to establish higher and more explicit standards of judicial conduct.
The American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted the final product of the Commit-
tee at its annual meeting in 1972. In 1989, the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility published a final draft of a revised Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, which the ABA House of Delegates adopted in 1990. In many ways, the 1990 Model
Code contains the basic standards of the 1972 Code. However, the 1990 Model Code is
written in gender neutral language and, for purposes of clarity, frequently uses the term "shall"
rather than "should." Other significant additions of form include a preamble and a section
on terminology.
2. The Preamble to the 1990 Code states:
The Code of Judicial Conduct is not intended as an exhaustive guide for the conduct
of judges. They should also be governed in their judicial and personal conduct by
general ethical standards. The Code is intended, however, to state basic standards
which should govern the conduct of all judges and to provide guidance to assist
judges in establishing high standards of judicial and personal conduct.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble (1990).
3. As of early 1996, the following jurisdictions have adopted all or part of the 1990
Model Code: United States Judicial Conference, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland,
Magsachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming.
4. According to the Preamble of the 1990 Code:
When the text uses "shall" or "shall not," it is intended to impose binding obligations
the violation of which can result in disciplinary action. When "should" or "should
not" is used, the text is intended as hortatory and as a statement of what is or is not
appropriate conduct but not as a binding rule under which a judge may be
disciplined.
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The objective of the Code is to maintain both the reality of judicial
integrity and the appearance of that reality. The public has confidence
in judges who show character, impartiality, and diligence. For each
judge, the Code serves as a guide for self-assessment. For judges
reviewing the propriety of other judges' behavior, the Code may function
as the support for imposing discipline or the basis for review of a trial
court's judgment.5 In either situation, the primary purpose of the Code
is to protect the public rather than to discipline an individual judge.
Canon 2 of the Code instructs a judge to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities. Although the
language of Canon 2 and its subparts6 is more general than most of the
other canons, it has withstood first amendment overbreadth7 and due
process void-for-vagueness8 challenges. Judicial ignorance of this Canon
or any of its subparts is no defense or excuse.9
5. The Preamble to the 1990 Code further states:
The Code is designed to provide guidance to judges ... and to provide a structure
for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. It is not designed or intended
as a basis for civil liability or criminal prosecution....
The text of the Canons and Sections is intended to govern conduct of judges and
to be binding upon them. It is not intended, however, that every transgression will
result in disciplinary action. Whether disciplinary action is appropriate, and the
degree of discipline to be imposed, should be determined through a reasonable and
reasoned application of the text and should depend on such factors as the seriousness
of the transgression, whether there is a pattern of improper activity and the effect of
the improper activity on others or on the judicial system.
Id.
6. The complete text of Canon 2 of the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct follows.
A discussion about the adoption of each subpart, its Commentary, and the case law applying
Canon 2 is located in the text to notes infra.
Canon 2. A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in
All of the Judge's Activities.
A. A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in
a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
B. A judge shall not allow family, social, political or other relationships to
influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment. A judge shall not lend the
prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others; nor
shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a
special position to influence the judge. A judge shall not testify voluntarily as a
character witness.
C. A judge shall not hold membership in any organization that practices
invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin.
7. See, e.g., Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225, 1239-40 (D.D.C. 1977); In re Conduct
of Roth, 645 P.2d 1064, 1069-70 (Or. 1982).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Matter of Jenkins, 465 N.W.2d 317, 321 (Mich. 1991), (judge's "professed
ignorance" of prohibition on ex parte communications bolstered the conclusion that judge had
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Regrettably, judicial discussions of Canon 2 issues frequently devote
more attention to the appropriate sanction for the judge's misconduct
than to the question of whether a violation occurred. Reviewing courts
rarely define or analyze the relation between the applicable ethical
standard and the offending conduct. Worse, they often include Canon
2's general language about the appearance of impropriety when that
standard is not the stated basis for the disciplinary charges against the
judge or for the appeal of a civil or criminal judgment.
This Article focuses on the diverse parts of Canon 2 and the cases in
which courts have explicitly applied those standards. Each section
compares the language of the 1972 and 1990 Codes, and the extent to
which the states have modified the Code's black-letter language or its
Commentary."° Following the exposition of Code language, the Article
discusses and analyzes the judicial decisions that contravene the norm of
Canon 2 judicial decisionmaking.
II. AVOIDING IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPRO-
PRIETY
A. The Code and Its Commentary
Canon 2 of the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A
Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in
All of the Judge's Activities."" In 1990, the ABA amended both the
title of Canon 2 and its black-letter principles as part of the process of
replacing the 1972 ABA Code. To enhance the clarity of the new
Code's provisions, the language of Canon 2 is mandatory and gender
neutral, whereas the 1972 Code's language was aspirational and hortatory
and used only masculine pronouns. Following Canon 2 and its black-
shown "fundamental disregard for the Code"); In re Collins, 524 So. 2d 553, 557 (Miss. 1987)
("claim of ignorance ... as defense to judicial misconduct charge is tantamount to admission"
of lack of qualification for office); In re Wilkes, 403 So. 2d 35, 42 (La. 1981) (ignorance of
Code is "no defense so long as [judge] ... intentionally or consciously committed acts" for
which judicial discipline is sought).
10. The Preamble to the 1990 Code states that the "Commentary, by explanation and
example, provides guidance with respect to the purpose and meaning of the Canons and
Sections. The Commentary is not intended as a statement of additional rules." MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDuCT Preamble (1990).
11. Several states have modified the language of the 1972 heading-"A Judge Should
Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities"-to make it
gender neutral. See, e.g., Connecticut, Louisiana, Missouri, New Jersey, and Washington.
Idaho does not use any heading. Maryland shortened the heading to "Avoidance of
Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety." MD. Cr. R. 1231, CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDuCT Canon 2 (1994).
[Vol. 79:949
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letter principles, the 1972 Code provided three paragraphs of Commen-
tary. Although most states ratified the 1972 version of the Commentary
as part of the Code, ten states chose not to adopt any portion of the
Commentary." The Commentary to the 1990 version of Canon 2 is
more detailed than the 1972 version.'
The 1990 Commentary to Canon 2A consists of two paragraphs. The
first paragraph is a gender neutral version of the first paragraph to the
1972 version of Canon 2."4 The second paragraph amplifies the
statements of the first paragraph and defends the necessity for general-
ized standards. More important, the language offers guidance to
litigators and judges as well as to lay members of judicial disciplinary
bodies regarding the meaning of Canon 2's leading terms of art: the
scope of violations comprising an actual impropriety and the type of
conduct constituting the appearance of impropriety."
12. These states are Alaska, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Vermont, and Virginia.
13. The format also differs, with Commentary following each of the three black-letter
Canons instead of being located at the end of all the black-letter language.
Most states ratifying the 1990 black-letter principles also adopted the 1990 Commentary,
leaving several states, as with the 1972 Code, electing not to adopt any portion of the
Commentary. Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Texas, and Utah have not
adopted any portion of the 1990 Commentary, but Maine and Michigan have incorporated part
of the Commentary into its black-letter principles. MAINE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDuCr
Canon 2 (1994); MICHIGAN CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1994).
14. See infra note 28.
15. The prohibition against behaving with impropriety or the appearance of
impropriety applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge.
Because it is not practicable to list all prohibited acts, the proscription is necessarily
cast in general terms that extend to conduct by judges that is harmful although not
specifically mentioned in the Code. Actual improprieties under this standard include
violations of law, court rules or other specific provisions of this Code. The test for
appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds
a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity,
impartiality and competence is impaired.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2A, at paragraph 2 (1990). See
infra notes 36 and 37.
The Delaware and Florida Codes add to the phrase "whether the conduct would create
in reasonable minds" the following: "with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances that a
reasonable inquiry would disclose." In addition, the Delaware Code adds the following
sentence: "A judge does not violate this Code merely because a personal or judicial decision
of the judge may be erroneous." DELAWARE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to
Canon 2A, at paragraph 2 (1995); FLORIDA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to
Canon 2A, at paragraph 2 (1995).
New Jersey omits the second paragraph of the Canon 2 Commentary.
The ABA also rejected several paragraphs of Commentary that were part of an earlier
draft. Those paragraphs included the following ideas: 1) acts may be improper, regardless of
whether they violated a specific provision of the Code, e.g., a violation of "clear and accepted
1996]
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B. Case Law and Analysis
Courts frequently refer to Canon 2 when deciding whether a judge
has violated the Code. When Canon 2A, Canon 2B, or other portions
of the Code are the basis for allegations of improper behavior, courts
often rely on the title of Canon 2 itself as an alternative ground for
discipline. In other words, even if the judge's actions did not violate
another part of the Code, the conduct was improper, or at least appears
to have been improper. 6 Controversy arises when courts attempt to
interpret the admonition of Canon 2 as a rule of discipline by itself.
What constitutes a punishable "impropriety" or "appearance of
impropriety?"
Propriety... is often in the eye of the beholder. A given
individual will find conduct to be within or beyond the bounds of
propriety to the extent the conduct comports with that individu-
al's own highly subjective views of propriety.
In many instances society shares common values and a common
sense of "propriety." In such cases, the limits of "propriety" may
be readily apparent. Nonetheless, disciplinary rules expressed in
terms of "propriety" risk mercurial existence rising and falling
with the temper of the moment.17
Defining the scope of "impropriety" has been a threshold issue for
judges who must assess their own conduct or who must rule on the
propriety of conduct by other judges. Are judges subject to discipline
under Canon 2 for personal as well as professional misbehavior? Can
they be sanctioned for deportment that is neither tortious nor crimi-
community standards"; and 2) a list of examples of apparent impropriety that, though not "a
per se violation of the law or [Code]," serve to bring the judiciary into disrepute.
Examples of such conduct include uttering racial epithets in or out of court even if
no actual bias is shown in judicial decisions; contacting a litigant in a case or matter
pending before the court to request a personal favor in another matter; and carrying
on business transactions that give the appearance of unfair advantage.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucT 7-8 (Discussion Draft 1989).
16. An allegation or concern about the appearance of impropriety does not always lead
to a finding of a violation. For example, in Trimble v. State, 871 S.W.2d 562, 567 (Ark. 1994),
an appellate court refused to reverse a criminal conviction on the basis that the judge's college
age son worked in the prosecutor's office during the time of the trial. While the court agreed
"that the appearance generated by the employment of a judge's son at the prosecutor's office
is none too good," it found that the summer employment in and of itself did not warrant
reversal. Id. at 567.
17. Matter of Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 580-81 (Pa. 1992).
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nal? s Because the focus of Canon 2's black-letter principles is on the
need for public trust in the decency and impartiality of the judiciary,
courts have answered each of the two questions in the affirmative. This
represents a somewhat broader view than is stated in the Commentary.
A judge may be punished for any conduct that legitimately reflects upon
the judge's ability to act in an official capacity. While this view is
necessarily general, it implicitly rejects the imposition of sanctions merely
because the judge is an offensive person but permits sanctions when the
conduct was neither criminal nor tortious.19
Assuming that the judge's behavior cannot be classified as improper,
but nevertheless looks improper, how do courts evaluate an appearance
of impropriety?' By what or whose standards do courts measure the
term "appearance"? As Reporter to the 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct,
Professor Thode noted "that despite the generality, an 'impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety' standard is necessary."'" He went on
to identify certain forms of proscribed conduct such as "influence
peddling," in which "appearance" is often a central part of the substan-
tive evil.2' Under ejusdem generis principles, there is no indication that
the "appearance of impropriety" standard should be freely applied.
Indeed, lack of specificity as to what conduct makes a judge vulnerable
to a charge of appearance of impropriety raises serious due process
concerns. Leaving the rules unidentified while expecting them to be
observed is bound to burden judges with uncertainty; perhaps what is
acceptable today will be deemed aberrant tomorrow. Putting men and
18. The Code of Judicial Conduct "forbids or requires acts neither forbidden nor
required by ordinary citizens, or even attorneys subject to other ethical restrictions." Id. at
579. See Mississippi Comm'n v. Milling, 651 So. 2d 531 (Miss. 1995) (judge removed for living
with person she knew was fugitive from another state and for participating actively in fugitive's
case).
19. Matter of Glancey (II), 542 A.2d 1350, 1355-56 (Pa. 1988).
20. Scholars and judges have expressed their views about what constitutes a censurable
appearance of impropriety. See, e.g., Steven Lubet, Judicial Impropriety: Love, Friendship,
Free Speech, and Other Intemperate Conduct, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 379 (1986); Robert J.
Martineau, Disciplining Judges for Non-Official Conduct A Survey and Critique of the Law,
10 U. BALT. L. REV. 225 (1981); William Rehnquist, Sense and Non-Sense About Judicial
Ethics, 28 THE RECORD 694 (1973).
21. E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr 49 (1972).
22. Id. Another way to characterize this behavior is the appearance of "cronyism" or
"judge shopping." See In the Matter of Laster, 274 N.W.2d 742, 745 (Mich. 1979) (public
reprimand due to judge's grant of many bond remissions originally ordered forfeited).
In addition to the appearance of favoritism, the judge's conduct may suggest the
appearance that the judge is trying to hide something. See, e.g., In the Matter of Hendrix, 701
P.2d 841, 845 (Ariz. 1985) (censure of judge, in part because the judge permitted the court
reporter to delete certaii comments from a trial transcript).
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women who have to judge the rights of others under such stress tends to
undermine their own sense of worth. "Our legal system should treat
those who preside over it with more regard."'
The leading view is that a court should review judicial behavior by its
appearance "to a reasonable person following review of the totality of
the circumstances."'24 Suppose a judge receives a product or service
23. Spector v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 418 N.Y.S.2d 565, 571 (1979) (citing
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 26-29, 38-39 (rev. ed. 1969)).
Justice Arthur Goldberg remarked to Congress that the "appearance of impropriety"
canon was "unbelievably ambiguous," and that judges "can benefit greatly from having some
ground rules against which to measure their conduct ... particularly... in this area of
avoiding even the appearance of impropriety." Nonjudicial Activities of Supreme Court
Justices: Hearings on S. 1097 and S. 2109 Before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
24. Matter of Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 584 (Pa. 1992) cert. denied, In re Larsen, 114 S. Ct.
65 (1993). The ABA refused to adopt as part of the 1990 Commentary to Canon 2 the notion
that, "[iun exercising discretion in his or her personal conduct, a judge should consider the
conduct from the perspective of a person who knows only what is apparent." MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 7 (Discussion Draft 1989). The Larsen standard is broader, for it is
not restricted to the judge's personal conduct. It also provides a standard of review for others
to apply rather than a measure of self-assessment. Either approach necessarily rejects the
reasonable misinformed or uninformed person standard, i.e., the uninformed or misinformed
mind "often assigns guilt where none exists." Larsen, 616 A.2d at 584. "[R]easonable citizens
require more than vague conjectures and subtle innuendo before they will entertain suspicions
of judicial misconduct or ascribe the 'appearance of impropriety' to ambiguous facts and
circumstances." Id. See Spector, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 572. As the foregoing suggests, the courts
generally agree that the proper perspective is the reasonable person, not the specific person(s)
who are parties or witnesses to the misconduct. Compare Matter of Cunningham, 456
N.Y.S.2d 36, 38 (1982), in which the court noted that "to the extent that [the] ... misconduct
consisted of creating the appearance of impropriety, it is of some moment that the possible
perception of this improper conduct was limited to the eyes of one person only."
In Matter of Mason, 916 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1990), Judge Easterbrook posed the dilemma
of applying an objective standard to a request for judicial disqualification:
An objective standard is essential when the question is how things appear to the well-
informed, thoughtful observer rather than to a hypersensitive or unduly suspicious
person. Because some people see goblins behind every tree, a subjective approach
would approximate automatic disqualification. A reasonable observer is unconcerned
about trivial risks; there is always some risk, a probability exceeding 0.0001%, that
a judge will disregard the merits. Trivial risks are endemic, and if they were enough
to require disqualification we would have a system of peremptory strikes and judge-
shopping, which itself would imperil the perceived ability of the judicial system to
decide cases without regard to persons. A thoughtful observer understands that
putting disqualification in the hands of a party, whose real fear may be that the judge
will apply rather than disregard the law, could introduce a bias into adjudication.
Thus the search is for a risk substantially out of the ordinary.
An objective standard creates problems in implementation. Judges must imagine
how a reasonable, well-informed observer of the judicial system would react. Yet the
judge does not stand outside the system; as a dispenser rather than a recipient or
observer of decisions, the judge understands how professional standards and the
[Vol. 79:949
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from a person or entity, free of charge or at an unduly favorable rate.
Other Code provisions prohibit gifts from a current party.' Is a gift
from a non-party likewise banned on the "appearance of impropriety"
theory because everyone is a "potential litigant"?26 Courts that have
thoughtfully considered the framework for an appearance of impropriety
analysis have applied a totality of the circumstances approach and
deemed the following issues necessary for resolution: 1) the historical
context for the gift, e.g., was the donor in a special position to influence
the judge; 2) the judge's view of the disputed facts, e.g., was the judge
aware of any improper motive by the donor; and 3) the judge's
reputation as an ethical and respected jurist. Based on these inquiries,
a court will determine whether a reasonable person would conclude that
a violation of Canon 2 had occurred. In other words, after considering
all the circumstances, would a reasonable person's perception be one of
suspicion?27
III. COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW AND PROMOTING CONFIDENCE IN
THE JUDICIARY
A. The Code and Its Commentary
The general language of Canon 2A states: "A judge shall respect and
comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."2"
desire to preserve one's reputation often enforce the obligation to administer justice
impartially, even when an observer might be suspicious. Judges asked to recuse
themselves hesitate to impugn their own standards; judges sitting in review of others
do not like to cast aspersions. Yet drawing all inferences favorable to the honesty
and care of the judge whose conduct has been questioned could collapse the
appearance of impropriety standard under §455(a) into a demand for proof of actual
impropriety. So although the court tries make an external reference to the
reasonable person, it is essential to hold in mind that these outside observers are less
inclined to credit judges' impartiality and mental discipline than the judiciary itself
will be.
Id. at 386.
25. Canon 4D(5) of the 1990 Code prohibits a judge from accepting a gift, subject to
several exceptions. Also, Canon 4D(1)(a) prohibits financial business dealings by a judge that
may reasonably be perceived to exploit the judge's judicial position. The 1972 Code contains
similar provisions in Canon 5C(1) and 5C(4).
26. In Matter of Chiovero, 570 A.2d 57,65 (Pa. 1990), the court indicated that, while in
the abstract every person on earth is a potential litigant who might appear in the judge's court,
that view was unacceptable because it would preclude interaction with other human beings.
27. Larsen, 616 A.2d at 583.
28. Canon 2A of the 1972 version of the ABA Code provides: "A judge should respect
and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes
1996]
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The first paragraph of the 1990 Commentary addresses the general
need to maintain public confidence in the judiciary by avoiding all
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.2 9 The ABA declined
to include draft Commentary language that illustrated, based on earlier
interpretations of Canon 2A, actual impropriety relating to a judge's
professional and personal conduct." It also dismissed a more general
maxim that a judge must avoid conduct that harms "public confidence
in the judiciary and which are for that reason alone improper."31
B. Case Law and Analysis
1. Scope of Canon 2A
Judicial decisions applying Canon 2A typically involve disciplinary
cases against sitting judges; less frequent applications of Canon 2A arise
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CoNDUCT Canon 2A (1972). Italics indicate language in the 1972 Code that is
different from the 1990 Code.
Idaho substitutes "does not detract from" for "promotes." IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 2A (1994).
Maryland also added two new sentences: "A judge should behave with propriety and
should avoid even the appearance of impropriety" and "The personal behavior of a judge in
both the performance of judicial duties, and in everyday life, should be beyond reproach."
MD. CT. R. 1231, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A (1994).
Michigan added the following sentence: "Without regard to a person's race, gender, or
other protected personal characteristic, a judge should treat every person fairly, with courtesy
and respect." MICHIGAN CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (1994).
Delaware, New Jersey, and Iowa replace the word "shall" with "should" in both instances.
DELAWARE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A (1995); NEW JERSEY CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A (1994); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A
(1995).
New Mexico prefaces Canon 2A with the statement "Respect for the law." N.M. SUP. Cr.
R. 1986, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 21-200A (1995).
29. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct
by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A
judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must
therefore accept restrictions on the judge's conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2A, at paragraph 1 (1990). The
first paragraph of the 1972 Canon 2 Commentary is identical, except that it is gender neutral.
30. For example, authorities interpreting this standard have found actual
impropriety in a judge's professional or personal conduct where a judge fails to
cooperate with authorities when apprehended breaking the law, is frequently
intoxicated in public, openly solicits sexual favors, discharges a court employee for
failure to perform personal services, or demonstrates a pattern of unfair treatment
against a lawyer and the lawyer's firm in the conduct of cases.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 7 (Discussion Draft 1989).
31. Id.
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from appeals of civil or criminal litigation presided over by the judge.
In the usual case, the judge is accused of multiple transgressions based
upon alleged violations of both Canon 2A and other Code sections3 2
Under most state systems of judicial discipline, the sanction for
unethical conduct ranges from private reprimand to removal. Prior to
the disciplinary case reaching the state's highest court, a state judicial
qualifications commission already has reviewed the case, and has made
findings of fact and a recommendation to that court. Too often, judicial
review of commission findings adds little more than a recitation of the
facts, the applicable Code sections that have been violated, and a
reference to whether the court accepts the commission's recommenda-
tions.
Occasionally, courts make the effort to discuss the language of Canon
2A, dissect it, and explain its scope. Canon 2A has two parts that
judicial decisions often treat interchangeably: 1) a general admonition
that a judge has an obligation to respect and comply with the law; and
2) a general warning that a judge must act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary. Because the two clauses are independent of each other, it is
necessary to find a violation of one clause or the other in order to find
a violation of Canon 2A.33 Inclusion of the phrase "at all times," along
with the Commentary language about a judge being the subject of
"constant public scrutiny," clearly indicates that Canon 2A covers
conduct in the judge's official or personal capacity.34 Moreover, under
32. A violation of the specific provisions of the Code also constitutes a violation of
Canon 2A. See, e.g., Matter of Benoit, 523 A.2d 1381, 1382 (Me. 1987) ("judge who fails to
conform his conduct to the minimum standards of other Canons of the Code, is, by definition,
in violation of the general requirements of Canon[] ... 2(A)").
Moreover, a judge's conduct must conform to the applicable ethical standards for
attorneys as well as for judges. See; eg., In the Matter of Waterman, 448 N.W.2d 36, 38
(Mich. 1989) (professional misconduct by attorney who became a judge led to public censure);
In the Matter of Callanan, 355 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Mich. 1984) (removal of judge due to criminal
convictions); Florida Bar v. McCain, 361 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1978) (former Supreme Court
member disbarred for misconduct occurring while a member of judiciary).
33. In re Conduct of Roth, 645 P.2d 1064, 1069 (Or. 1982).
34. Matter of Backal, 660 N.E.2d 1104 (N.Y. 1995) (Code prohibits a judge's advice to
known lawbreaker on preserving fruits of crime and furnishing a hiding place for those fruits
in her home; removal ordered); In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 788 P.2d 716, 722 (Alaska
1990) (unethical behavior outside courtroom diminishes respect for judiciary); In re Hill, 568
A.2d 361, 373 (Vt. 1989) (Code reaches into judge's nonjudicial life); In the Matter of
Woodworth, 703 P.2d 844 (Kan. 1985) (even in private life, judge held to higher standards than
others); In re Winton, 350 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Minn. 1984) (judge's conduct in personal life
adversely affects administration of justice); In the Matter of Bennett, 267 N.W.2d 914, 922
(Mich. 1978) (judge should behave as though always on the bench); see In the Matter of
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Canon 2A, judges are held to a higher standard of personal and official
conduct than is expected of lawyers and others in society."
2. Obligation to Respect and Comply with the Law
In deciding whether a judge has failed to respect and comply36 with
the law,37 most court decisions suggest that any violation of law would
also violate Canon 2A. A few courts have qualified this blanket
application in two ways. First, a judge may violate Canon 2A without
a finding that the judge engaged in the precise criminal conduct charged.
Alternatively, a court may inquire into the judge's compliance with the
criminal law even if there is no criminal prosecution. 8 Second, because
many courts insist upon a willful violation of Canon 2A, not every
"violation of law, however trivial, harmless or isolated, would also be a
violation of Canon 2A.,,
39
A judge's ethical responsibility is to uphold the law, rather than to
disregard or violate it. The most repugnant breach of this standard of
decency occurs when a sitting judge is convicted of a criminal offense,'
Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 581 (Pa. 1992) (Code also concerned with conduct affecting judge while
acting in official capacity). Therefore, for purposes of Canon 2A the ability of judge to
perform official duties is not the decisive issue. Roth, 645 P.2d at 1069.
35. Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 788 P.2d at 722; In re Hill; 568 A.2d 361,373 (Vt. 1989)
(judge held to highest standard of any public official); Winton, 350 N.W.2d at 340; In re
Douglas, 382 A.2d 215, 219 (Vt. 1977) (ethical burdens of judges higher than for lawyers).
36. It has been suggested, but never explicitly decided, that the phrase "respect [for] the
law" implies inclusion of a lesser degree of wrongdoing than "compl[ying] with the law," or
whether the terms are instead conjunctive. Roth, 645 P.2d at 1069 n.4.
37. The word "law" is the only Canon 2 term defined in the Terminology section of the
1990 Code; the 1972 Code does not have a comparable segment. "Law" is defined as "court
rules as well as statutes, constitutional provisions, and decisional law." MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology at 5 (1990).
38. Roth, 645 P.2d at 1070. See Matter of Glancey (II), 542 A.2d 1350, 1355 (Pa. 1988)
(Canon 2 language not limited to criminal conduct).
39. Roth, 645 P.2d at 1070. The court noted that someday it may have to draw the line
between censurable and noncensureable violations of law. Id.
See In the Matter of Sawyer, 594 P.2d 805, 811 (Or. 1979) (minor traffic violations or
conduct engaged in good faith belief that it does not violate the law may not be appropriate
for discipline). Cf In the Matter of Neely, 364 S.E.2d 250, 255 n.8 (W. Va. 1987) ("any kind
of improper conduct can undermine public confidence in officials who should be above
reproach").
40. See, e.g., In re Huckaby, 656 So. 2d 292 (La. 1995) (removal for failure to file federal
tax return); Inquiry Concerning Esquiroz, 654 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1995) (nolo contendere plea to
"isolated circumstance" of DUI charge justifies public reprimand); In re McIver, 638 So. 2d
45 (Fla. 1994) (public reprimand for misdemeanor gambling convictions); In re Garrett, 613
So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1993) (removal from judgeship following shoplifting conviction); In the Matter
of Connor, 589 A.2d 1347 (NJ. 1991) (censure follows conviction for DUI, leaving scene of
accident, and reckless driving); In re Yandell, 772 P.2d 807 (Kan. 1989) (removal follows
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especially a conviction for dishonest conduct.4 Unscrupulous conduct
that does not result in criminal charges may also produce charges of
ethical wrongdoing, whether or not the conduct relates to the judge's
duties.4 2 For example, in In re Yandell,4' a judge was removed from
office under Canon 2A for pledging the same vehicle as security for two
different loans without advising either creditor of the other loan.
A less common application of Canon 2A arises when a judge in an
official capacity deliberately disregards binding precedent or mandatory
procedures for conducting court proceedings.' By contrast, a judge is
conviction for reckless driving and other ethical violations); In re Woodworth, 703 P.2d 844
(Kan. 1985) (public censure for conviction of possession of bootleg whiskey); In the Matter
of Callanan, 355 N.W.2d 69 (Mich. 1984) (removal following conviction of three felonies
involving conspiracy and complicity to violate RICO and commit mail fraud); In the Matter
of Killam, 447 N.E.2d 1233, 1234 (Mass. 1983) (public censure for DUI conviction). See also
Disciplinary Counsel v. Mosely, 632 N.E.2d 1287 (Ohio 1994) (judge disbarred after theft
convictions). A dispute may develop over the appropriate sanction for a judge who has been
convicted. In In the Matter of Brooks, 449 S.E.2d 87 (Ga. 1994), the Georgia Supreme Court
suspended a judge for three years, rejecting both the state bar's recommendation of
disbarment and the judge's request for a six-month suspension. The court's opinion prompted
a dissent that advocated disbarment as a penalty appropriate to the severity of the violation,
based upon the widespread and prolonged nature of the judge's sexual batteries on five
women, of whom some were court personnel. Id. at 90-91 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
41. "The integrity of the judicial system, the faith and confidence of the people in the
judicial process, and the faith of the people in the particular judge are all affected by the false
statements of a judge." In re Inquiry Concerning Judge Leon, 440 So. 2d 1267, 1269 (Fla.
1983). See State v. Imbriani, 652 A.2d 1222 (N.J. 1995) (embezzlement in private life consti-
tutes breach of public trust; removal ordered); In re Inquiry Concerning Judge Fowler, 602 So.
2d 510 (Fla. 1992) (public reprimand for conviction of furnishing false information about
accident).
42. See, eg., Matter of King, 399 S.E.2d 888, 890 (W. Va. 1990) (censure for
misrepresenting status of court decision); Matter of Conda, 370 A.2d 16, 19 (N.J. 1977)
(censure, in part for altering court records). See also Matter of Harshberger, 450 S.E.2d 667,
670 (W. Va. 1994) (judge admonished for illegally entering a polling place where he was not
registered to vote); Matter of Heburn, 639 N.E.2d 11, 12 (N.Y. 1994) (judge of town and
village courts removed for "deliberately deceptive" conduct in subscribing as witness to
signatures that were added to petition outside judge's presence); In re Thoma, 873 S.W.2d 477,
501 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1994) (removal of judge from office, in part for making misleading docket
entries; undermines public confidence in judiciary); Disciplinary Proceeding Against Ritchie,
870 P.2d 967, 973 (Wash. 1994) (removal for submitting misleading travel vouchers seeking
reimbursement for trips that were only marginally related to judicial duties).
43. 772 P.2d 807, 810 (Kan. 1989). Canon 1 was also the basis for Judge Yandell's
removal.
44. See, eg., In re Pauley, 318 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1984) (six-month suspension for one
instance of ignoring court procedures); In the Matter of Donohue, 458 N.E.2d 323 (Mass.
1983) (public censure for initiating probation violation proceedings when judge knew that
defendant already had completed term of probation, and for requiring a man to pay child
support for child known to have been fathered by another). See Ewing v. State, 358 N.E.2d
204 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (intentional disregard of court procedures not reversible error). See
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not likely to be disciplined for making erroneous legal rulings, absent
improper motive, ill will, or malice.'
To allow disciplinary proceedings to evaluate judicial decisions
could force judges to walk an ill-defined and standardless line
between propriety and impropriety. Clearly, such a sword over
a judge's head would have a tendency to chill his independence.
A judge would have to be as concerned with what is proper in the
eyes of the disciplinary commission as with what is the just
decision.
Similarly, Canon 2A is not a restriction on the right of an appellate judge
to dissent on an issue that has been reviewed previously by that court.
3. Promoting Public Confidence in the Integrity and Impartiality of
the Judiciary
For generations before and since it has been taught that a judge
must possess the confidence of the community; that [the judge]
must not only be independent and honest, but, equally important,
believed by all.., to be independent and honest .... "[J]ustice
must not only be done, it must be seen to be done." Without the
also Joseph B.P. v. Kathleen M.P., 469 A.2d 800 (Del. 1983) (judge disregarded property
settlement agreement and instead directed a division of the property contrary to the
agreement).
Disregard of precedent or standing court orders also threatens the other prong of Canon
2A-the maintenance of public confidence in the judiciary. See, e.g., In the Matter of Hague,
315 N.W.2d 524, 533 (Mich. 1982) (judge suspended for sixty days, in part for disobeying valid
orders entered by superior court and refusing to follow decisions of appellate courts; conduct
engendered disrespect for law and threatens public perception of impartial justice system).
45. See, e.g., In the Matter of Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350, 357 (Ala. 1984) (no violation of
Canon 2A); In the Matter of Greene, 317 S.E.2d 169, 171 (W. Va. 1984) (no violation for
inadvertent error in procedure); West Virginia Judicial Inquiry Commission v. Casto, 263
S.E.2d 79, 82 (W. Va. 1979) (no violation for error in applying proper legal procedure). Cf.
In re Weddel, 414 N.W.2d 178 (Minn. 1987) (judge reprimanded for imposing summary punish-
ment for contempt in precipitous manner). See also Lazofsky v. Sommerset Bus. Co., 389 F.
Supp. 1041, 1044 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (judicial ruling during trial not covered by Canon 2).
46. Ben F. Overton, Grounds for Judicial Discipline in the Context of Judicial
Disciplinary Commissions, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 59, 66 (1977). Several courts have
recognized the problem. See, e.g., In re Troy, 306 N.E.2d 203,217 (Mass. 1973); In re Judges
of Municipal Court of Cedar Rapids, 130 N.W.2d 553, 554 (Iowa 1964).
47. Giger v. District Court for the County of Summit, 540 P.2d 329,330-31 (Colo. 1975)
(Erickson, J., dissenting). Another appellate court judge in Giger specially concurred, stating
that an earlier opinion in which he dissented now was dispositive on the issue, even though
he thought it was still incorrectly decided. Id. at 330 (Groves, J., concurring specially). See
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 870 S.W.2d 383,384-385 (Ark. 1994) (no violation of Canon 2A
on ground that appellate judge wrote dissenting opinion in prior case involving some of same
issues involved in instant case).
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appearance as well as the fact of justice, respect for the law
vanishes in a democracy.'
Judicial behavior cannot malign the public's confidence in the judiciary.
While the misconduct of a single judge reflects unfavorably upon the
court over which the judge presides, for a disciplinary violation the
judge's wrongdoing must fail to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judicial system as a whole. The range
of cases applying this portion of Canon 2A is broad, with judges accused
of inattentive, rude, biased, and corrupt behavior. At times, this portion
of Canon 2A is the sole basis for allegations of unethical behavior,49
while in other instances it supplements a more explicit Code section.
A judge's activities, on and off the bench, must encourage public
trust. Judges must conduct themselves in a decent and dispassionate
manner. On the bench, they must be attentive to the proceedings,"0
treat attorneys and litigants with dignity and respect,5' remain neutral
and unbiased, and follow the applicable law. A judge must exercise
control to minimize disruption of court proceedings, but there are limits.
It is recognized also that the pressure of some proceedings may,
unfortunately, on an occasion lead a Judge to act in an unjudicial
manner. Such conduct on a rare occasion may be excused. That
does not mean, however, that a Judge may ever assume that he
is vested with tyrannical power over all that he surveys in his
48. In re Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727, 753 (Mich. 1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 1029
(1978) (quoting In re Greenberg, 280 A.2d 370,372 (1971), and Tamm, Are Courts Going the
Way of the Dinosaur?, 57 A.B.A. J. 229 (1971)).
49. For lay persons, perhaps nothing undermines public confidence in the judicial system
more than the inability of a judge to appear punctually in court and decide cases. In
Complaint Concerning Kirby, 354 N.W.2d 410,417 (Minn. 1984), a judge was publicly censured
in part for being unreasonably tardy in coming to court at least 20% of the time.
50. See Matter of Hey, 457 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 1995) (agreed resignation from practice
of law for judge who was intoxicated as sitting judge); Paine v. State, 823 P.2d 281 (Nev. 1991),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1405 (1995) (sentence vacated and case remanded after questions were
raised about whether one judge was sleeping during the proceedings).
51. In Matter of Schiff, 635 N.E.2d 286, 287 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1994), the judge was
removed, in part because in the presence of an Hispanic attorney, he stated that he recalled
a time when it was safe for young women to walk the streets "before the blacks and Puerto
Ricans moved here." The judge admitted that the remark was directed at the Hispanic
attorney and made to annoy her because she was involved in a controversy with a good friend
of the judge. Id. See In re Inquiry Concerning Lichtenstein, 685 P.2d 204, 209 (Colo. 1984)
(collecting cases on treating attorneys and litigants with dignity and respect); In the Matter of
Waltemade, 409 N.Y.S.2d 989, 994 (1975) (same).
Canon 3(A)(3), requiring judicial patience, dignity, and courtesy to all persons with whom
the judge deals in an official capacity, is usually alleged as another basis for judicial discipline.
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courtroom, or that the attorneys, litigants and witnesses are there
by his sufferance and subject to his temperamental whims.52
In addition to maintaining control over the courtroom, a judge's
conduct cannot suggest favoritism toward a party, attorney, or witness.53
In State v. Glanton,54 the Iowa Supreme Court criticized a trial judge
who directed student lawyers about when and how to make objections,
which not surprisingly the judge sustained. Despite the judge's good
intentions, the reviewing court appropriately observed:
In any event it is ordinarily a dangerous practice for a presiding
judge to contribute his efforts in an attempt to equalize what he
perceives to be disparity in the trial ability of opposing counsel.
Such practice is apt to proceed from disparity in the rightness of
one side or the other, rather than the preparation or ability of
counsel. It is often difficult for the presiding judge to distinguish
exactly where the one disparity begins and the other ends.
52. Waltemade, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 1004 (censure for discourteous and abusive remarks to
lawyers and litigants). See In the Matter of Sadofski, 487 A.2d 700, 705 (N.J. 1985) (public
reprimand for judge who used offensive language in court):
No matter how tired or vexed ... judges should not allow their language to sink
below a minimally acceptable level. Judges, like other members of society, will
occasionally have a "bad day." Even on such days, however, a judge must conduct
court proceedings in a manner that will maintain public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.
53. See, e.g., Adams v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 897 P.2d 544 (Cal. 1995) (judge
removed for accepting gifts or financial benefits from law firms or attorneys whose cases have
or are likely to come before the judge's court). Canon 2A is used sometimes as a general
supplement to the more specific dictates of Canon 3E of the Code, dealing with judicial
disqualification for conflicts of interest. See LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICA-
TION UNDER CANON 3 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 21-45 (2d ed. 1992).
54. 231 N.W.2d 31 (Iowa 1975).
55. Id. at 35-36. While it is traditional for lawyers and judges to counsel less experienced
attorneys, the trial process precludes a presiding judge from enjoying the satisfaction of
assisting new lawyers. Id. at 36.
Another blatant example of "good faith" bias arose in Paulson v. Evander, 633 So. 2d 540
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), where, during a hearing on a lawyer's motion to dismiss his former
wife's pro se petition, the judge sua sponte amended and redrafted pleadings for the former
spouse. In issuing a writ of prohibition and finding a violation of Canon 2A, the court noted
that the system of justice imposes upon the court "the duty of ruling on those matters brought
before it without participating in the redrafting of pleadings to state a cause of action." Id. at
541.
In In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, Gridley, 417 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1982), following
conviction of a criminal defendant, the trial judge personally injected himself and his office
into the matter as an advocate for the defendant. The judge corresponded with the defendant
and his family and filed a sua sponte order reducing the charge. For these and other ethical
violations, the judge was publicly reprimanded. See In re Damron, 487 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1987)
(judge removed from office, in part because judge intentionally discouraged defendant from
seeking attorney's services by threatening to incarcerate defendant); In the Matter of Buford,
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In Matter of Schiff,56 the New York Court of Appeals removed a judge,
in part for creating the impression that he was using his judicial powers
to satisfy a personal vendetta. A defendant in a civil case pending
before the judge was represented by a law firm, one of whose partners
was a local part-time judge who had dismissed traffic charges against a
driver whose car had collided with Judge Schiff. The judge stated that
he was so angry about that ruling that he intended to grant the plaintiff's
motion because the defendant was represented by the part-time judge's
law firm.
Courts rely upon Canon 2A to discipline judges for other forms of
inappropriate behavior. First, judges subvert public confidence by the
manner in which they treat court personnel and judicial colleagues.
Judges must not take advantage of their position to realize a personal
benefit, such as requiring court personnel to care for a judge's child.57
Unwelcome sexual advances toward court employees,5 as well as
exacting and demanding sexual favors as a condition of employment,
59
are unacceptable abuses of judicial power. Similarly, unflattering
remarks about judicial colleagues' physical appearance, impartiality, and
work habits fail to promote public confidence in the judiciary's integrity
and impartiality.' By contrast,
[n]ecessary judicial independence requires that a judge not be
subject to discipline for good faith comments directed primarily
and principally at issues properly before the court. Of course,
utilizing a court proceeding as a bully pulpit from which to
impose irresponsible and improper invectives upon colleagues or
577 S.W.2d 809, 837 (Mo. 1979) (thirty-day suspension, in part for judge's participation and
tacit approval of negotiation to have lawsuits, involving colleagues as parties, in other courts
dismissed in return for judge's action on matter before judge).
56. 635 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1994).
57. See, e.g., Matter of Neely, 364 S.E.2d 250,255 (W. Va. 1987) (judge admonished, in
part because of use of secretary to care for judge's child).
58. See Inquiry Relating to Alvord, 847 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Kan. 1993) (public censure for
patting court employee on buttocks); Complaint Concerning Miera, 426 N.W.2d 850, 856
(Minn. 1988) (collecting cases about unwelcome sexual advances even outside the employer-
employee relationship; public censure and one-year suspension).
59. Inquiry Relating to Hammond, 585 P.2d 1066, 1067 (Kan. 1978) (public censure).
60. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 188 Cal.Rptr. 880, 886
(1983), appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (removal, in part for such remarks). See also
In re Schenck, 870 P.2d 185, 200 (Or. 1994), cert denied, Schneck v. Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 195
(1994) (suspension, in part because judge violated Canon 2A by writing letter to editor of local
newspaper and a guest editorial in which the judge criticized the local prosecutor for
incompetence, inexperience, lack of professional demeanor, and immaturity).
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their professional performance would violate the code and subject
the judge to discipline.61
Second, courts discipline judges under Canon 2A for improper
contacts with other judges. By definition, an ex parte communication
undermines public confidence in the judiciary by raising concern about
why the contact is made without notifying the parties or counsel in the
case. For example, a judge should not contact another judge about a
case in which the contacting judge is a party.6 2 However, most ex parte
contact cases are similar to Matter of Larsen,63 in which an associate
justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was reprimanded for an ex
parte communication with a trial judge about a case pending before the
latter judge. The court first stated that, while all such ex parte communi-
cations are prohibited, they are not all deserving of the same, or perhaps
any, sanction.64
The highest level of culpability for ex parte contacts are discussions
between judges for criminal or other clearly improper motives, i.e., an
attempt to influence the contacted judge on someone's behalf.65 Less
culpable are injudicious ex parte conversations not made for clearly
improper motives, such as an attempt to learn about the status of a case
61. In re Brown, 879 S.W.2d 801,806 (Tenn. 1994) (Tennessee Supreme Court reversed
Court of the Judiciary's 6-5 finding of a Code violation for judge's open court, highly critical
comments about the fairness, efficiency, and lawfulness of the local juvenile court system,
which were relevant to a case before the court).
62. In the Matter of Sauce, 561 N.E.2d 751 (Ind. 1990) (public reprimand, in part
because judge obtained a change in custody through an ex parte communication with the judge
having jurisdiction of his dissolution case). Similarly, in Dixon v. State Commission on Judicial
Conduct, 419 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1979), a judge was admonished for requesting or appearing to
request that a fellow judge give special consideration to a party before the latter judge.
63. 616 A.2d 529 (Pa. 1992) (reprimand, despite absence of bad motive). In Larsen, the
justice met with the trial judge presiding over an estate case. He told the judge about two
anonymous informants who had told him that the co-administrator of the estate had engaged
in bankruptcy fraud.
64. While all ex parte communications with judges regarding cases pending before
those judges, may be equally prohibited, all ex parte communications are not equally
sanctionable.... [T]here is [a] spectrum of culpability with respect to ex parte
communications which ranges from the plainly criminally culpable, through the
injudicious, to good faith errors, and finally to truly innocent and innocuous ex parte
remarks. The magnitude of the misconduct will depend upon the context, content,
and manner of delivery of the ex parte communication.
Id. at 559.
65. See, e.g., In re Lorona, 875 P.2d 795,799-800 (Ariz. 1994) (suspension of nonlawyer
justice of the peace); Florida Bar v. McCain, 361 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1978) (disbarment of former
state supreme court justice).
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or to give the presiding judge information to trigger further inquiry.66
At the lowest level of culpability are improper communications made for
unquestionably proper motives, such as a letter from a trial judge to
appellate judges explaining why he had imposed high bail in particular
cases and that they should affirm his orders.67
IV. PERMITrING RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHERS TO INFLUENCE THE
JUDGE'S CONDUCT
A. The Code and Its Commentary
The language of Canon 2B is more specific than Canon 2A. The first
type of prohibited conduct addresses the improper connection between
judicial relationships and affiliations and the judge's conduct and
judgment. The 1990 version of the first sentence of Canon 2B states: "A
judge shall not allow family, social, political or other relationships to
influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment.) 68
Is any influence of these relationships on the judge's conduct
prohibited? Can these relationships ever be said to influence judicial
conduct in a proper way? Surely, the values that a judge acquires from
relationships influence the judge's conduct and judgment, but Canon 2B
appears to address the influence that the relationship itself can have on
66. See, e.g., In re DiLorenzo, 330 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1972) (public censure for judge who
arranged to meet with counsel in charge of a commission investigation).
67. In re Emmett, 300 So. 2d 435 (Ala. 1974) (censure not appropriate, though the
communication was technically improper because letter was not sent to parties or counsel).
Other factors that affect assessment of this type of misconduct include whether the
contacting judge: (1) has a reputation as an ethical judge, (2) is in a position of authority over
the contacted judge, and (3) has put the impermissible communication in writing, which
provides a record of the information conveyed. Larsen, 616 A.2d at 559-561.
68. The first sentence of Canon 2B of the 1972 version of the ABA Code provides: "A
judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to influence his judicial conduct
or judgment." Italics indicate language in the 1972 Code that is different from the 1990 Code.
Delaware, New Jersey, and Iowa replace the word "shall" with "should." DELAWARE
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (1995); NEW JERSEY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 2B (1994); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (1995).
Instead of identifying specific relationships, Texas prohibits the influence of any
relationship on the judge. TEXAS RULES OF COURT CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B
(West 1994).
Delaware, Iowa, and Oregon omit "political" relationships from the listing of possible
influencing relationships. DELAWARE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (1995); IOWA
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (1995); OREGON CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
Judicial Rule 1-101 (E) (1996).
New Mexico prefaces Canon 2B with the subheading "Impartiality." N. M. SUp. Cr. R.
1986, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 21-200A (1995).
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the judge. Although it is implicit from the Canon 2B standard, one state
has added that the relationships cannot be allowed to improperly
influence the judge's conduct or judgment.69
B. Case Law and Analysis
A judicial system must be free from the allegations that judges are
taking advantage of their position to help or harm others. Canon 3E
explicitly prohibits a judge from presiding in a case in which a close
relative is a party or counsel, or in which the judge or relative has some
interest.70  However, a judge's position may enable the judge to assist
friends or relatives in ways beyond hearing cases. Canon 2B's broader
proscription seeks to ensure that a judge will not allow family or other
relationships to influence the exercise of judicial conduct or judgment,
regardless of whether the judge is actually presiding over a case involving
a friend or relative. Incredibly, judges continue to violate this obvious
tenet.
The Canon 2B cases represent a broad range of circumstances in
which judges have permitted family, social, political, or other relation-
ships to affect judicial conduct or judgment. A typical example of this
ethical violation occurs when the judge directly or indirectly participates
in the handling of legal charges against a family member. In one case,
the Nebraska Supreme Court ordered that a judge be removed from
office when the judge delayed the prosecution of the judge's son's traffic
citation in bad faith by removing the citation from the appearance date
file.71 In another case, a judge was reprimanded because he "allowed
69. In Maryland, the judge's conduct cannot be improperly influenced by the judge's
relationships. MD. CT. R. 1231, CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucr Canon 2B (1994).
70. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 3E(1)(d) (1990).
One consequence of a Canon 2B violation may be the judge's disqualification from the
case. For example, in Matter of Rowe, 566 A.2d 1001, 1008 (Del. Jud. 1989), the judge's son
was arrested and charged with driving under the influence. The judge presided over the son's
initial appearance and continued the arraignment for several weeks, at which time the judge
would be presiding in the same court. At that time the judge proceeded to dispose of the case
with only the judge and son in the courtroom. The judge asserted that he acted in his son's
case because he was angry, embarrassed, and wanted to ensure that his son understood the
seriousness of the offense. Regardless of whether the judge felt he could be impartial in
resolving his son's case, the judge was suspended for six months for failure to recuse himself
because his "impartiality might reasonably be questioned" under Canon 3E(1). See Scogin v.
State, 227 S.E.2d 780,782 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (judge should have recused himself from presid-
ing over criminal case against father of friend's child after giving friend advice about how to
obtain support for child from father).
71. State ex rel. Comm'n of Judicial Qualifications v. Kelly, 407 N.W.2d 182 (Neb. 1987).
A timely prosecution for the traffic offense would have jeopardized the son's probation status.
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his anger over the procedure employed in the arrest of a family member
to influence his conduct as a judge."72 The judge conducted a loud
conversation in chambers with a police captain during working hours
when both were acting in their official capacities. In Matter of Boese,73
a judge received a public reprimand because, while on duty, she
threatened her ex-husband with arrest in a way which suggested that her
"relationship" with him was affecting her judicial conduct.
Judicial conduct may be subject to the influence of friendship as well.
The judge may be disciplined under Canon 2B for using the direct
approach, i.e., dismissing or filing away friends' civil or criminal
complaints pending in the judge's court.74 Discipline is also appropriate
when a judge approaches an attorney or fellow judge to try to sway the
disposition of a friend's case or to coerce a prosecutor into accepting a
plea bargain in a case against a friend.'
Id. at 187.
72. Matter of Cox, 532 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Me. 1987). In re Lockwood, 804 P.2d 738 (Az.
1990) involved the judge's telephone call to a police detective investigating his son to question
the method of the investigation and the amount of bail that had been requested. Although
the judge claimed to be calling as a concerned parent, his judicial position was apparent to the
officer. The judge received a public censure in part for his attempt to influence an ongoing
investigation. See also In re Mullen, 530 So. 2d 175, 178 (Miss. 1988) (judge suspended for
refusing to permit a debtor to redeem replevied property and then purchasing the property
and placing the title in the name of a family member).
73. 410 S.E.2d 282 (W. Va. 1991).
74. See, e.g., Matter of Ross, 428 A.2d 858 (Me. 1981) (suspension in part for causing
friends' traffic tickets to be filed away).
75. Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Chinn, 611 So. 2d 849 (Miss. 1992) (judge
removed, in part due to trying to influence another judge to give favorable treatment to a
criminal defendant); Inquiry Concerning Eads, 362 N.W.2d 541 (Iowa 1985) (suspension in part
for judge interjecting himself into divorce case involving an attorney-friend); Gonzalez v.
Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 657 P.2d 372 (Cal. 1983) (removal for trying to obtain
dismissal of criminal charges); In re Miller, 572 P.2d 896 (Kan. 1977) (censure for asking
presiding judge to dismiss traffic ticket issued to friend); Spruance v. Commission on Judicial
Qualifications, 532 P.2d 1209 (Cal. 1975) (same as Gonzalez). See Matter of Lewis, 535 N.E.2d
127 (Ind. 1989) (suspension for judge who had private conversations in chambers with personal
friend about friend's relative's case, which was pending before judge).
In Spruance, a judge was removed from office, in part for trying to help friends and
political supporters. Judge Spruance also improperly assumed jurisdiction over a criminal
defendant's case so that he could release the defendant on his own recognizance, thereby
allowing the defendant to avoid police interrogation on an outstanding warrant. Spruance, 532
P.2d at 1219.
"Other" relationships may improperly influence the judge's conduct and judgment. In
Bailey v. Superior Court, 636 P.2d 144 (Az. Ct. App. 1981), after the judge's secretary became
pregnant the judge issued an "investigative subpoena" to the putative father, whom the judge
advised to hire an attorney because he was being charged with a criminal offense. Issuance
of the subpoena violated Canon 2B.
1996]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Allegations of political favoritism under Canon 2B may produce
motions to disqualify judges whose contributors appear in their court.
16In Rocha v. Ahmad,7 a motion to recuse two appellate judges was
made on the ground that opposing counsel previously had made
substantial political contributions to each judge and had hosted victory
parties for them after their election. The court denied the motion,
finding that no ethical violation had occurred because the judges
received no contributions from a party to the litigation and because
attorneys are the primary source of contributions in judicial elections.
A candidate for the bench who relies solely on contributions from
nonlawyers must reconcile himself to staging a campaign on
something less than a shoestring. If a judge cannot sit on a case
in which a contributing lawyer is involved as counsel, judges who
have been elected would have to recuse themselves in perhaps a
majority of the cases filed in their courts.77
The court's broad language disguises the differing roles that attorneys
can play in judicial election campaigns. Judicial disqualification
whenever a typical contributor is counsel of record makes no practical
sense unless some actual impropriety is shown. However, where, for
example, counsel of record is the judge's current or past campaign
manager, there may be an appearance that the political relationship with
the campaign manager would influence the judge's judicial conduct or
judgment.8
V. LENDING THE PRESTIGE OF THE JUDGE TO ADVANCE PRIVATE
INTERESTS OR CONVEYING THE IMPRESSION THAT OTHERS CAN
INFLUENCE THE JUDGE
A. The Code and Its Commentary
Canon 2B also states: "A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial
office to advance the private interests of the judge or others; nor shall a
judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in
76. 662 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
77. Id. at 78.
78. "Other relationships" under Canon 2B may also interfere with judicial conduct. In
In Interest of McFall, 617 A.2d 707 (Pa. 1992), a state judge had agreed to serve as an
undercover agent for federal authorities after accepting an illegal gift. The judge continued
to hear cases while cooperating with federal authorities, in exchange that her cooperation
would be made known to the state prosecutor who appeared daily in the judge's court and
who later might prosecute her. The reviewing court ordered new proceedings for any criminal
case in which the judge had presided.
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a special position to influence the judge."79 States have modified the
language of Canon 2B by including (1) specific types of interests that
cannot be advanced;"0 and (2) those persons whom the judge cannot
permit to convey the impression of undue influence."'
As with Canon 2A, the Canon 2B Commentary builds on earlier
judicial and disciplinary experiences to provide some general direction.
The first paragraph attempts to distinguish proper and improper uses by
the judge of the prestige of the judicial office.' The second paragraph
79. The second sentence of Canon 2B of the 1972 version of the ABA Code provides:
"He should not lend the prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor
should he convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position
to influence him." Italics indicate language in the 1972 Code that is different from the 1990
Code.
New Jersey keeps the word "should" instead of "shall." NEW JERSEY CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 2B (1994).
New Mexico retains the use of the word "shall" the first time it appears, but substitutes
"shall" for "should" the second time it is used in the sentence. N.M. Sup. CT. R. 1986, CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 21-200b (1995). Oregon substitutes the phrase "use the
position" for "lend the prestige of the office." OREGON CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
Judicial Rule 1-101 (F) (1996).
The Delaware and Iowa Codes do not prohibit advancing the private interests of "thejudge and others," only the private interests of "others." DELAWARE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 2B (1995); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (1995).
80. California substitutes the phrase "pecuniary or personal" for "private." CALIFORNIA
CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 2B(2) (1996). Michigan shortens Canon 2B's second
sentence to prohibit the use of the prestige of the judicial office to advance the personal
business interests or those of others. MICHIGAN CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B
(1994).
81. New Mexico adds the phrase "subject to the judge's direction and control" after
"permit others." N.M. SUP. Cr. R. 1986, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 21-200B
(1995). Thus, proof of improper behavior must include that such persons were under the
judge's control when they conveyed the impression they could influence the judge. By
contrast, both Pennsylvania and West Virginia add the mental state of "knowingly" before the
word "permit," so that the judge's awareness of permitting others to communicate improper
influence connotes the judge's facilitation of the impropriety. PENNSYLVANIA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (1994); WEST VIRGINIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
2B (1994).
82. Maintaining the prestige of judicial office is essential to a system of government
in which the judiciary functions independently of the executive and legislative
branches. Respect for the judicial office facilitates the orderly conduct of legitimate
judicial functions. Judges should distinguish between proper and improper use of the
prestige of office in all of their activities. For example, it would be improper for a
judge to allude to his or her judgeship to gain a personal advantage such as defer-
ential treatment when stopped by a police officer for a traffic offense. Similarly,
judicial letterhead must not be used for conducting a judge's personal business.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Cannon 2B, at paragraph 1 (1990).
Arkansas has modified the last sentence to state that judicial letterhead cannot "be used
to gain a personal advantage or to effect an economic advantage." ARKANSAS CODE OF
1996]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:949
expands that idea by addressing the impropriety of using the prestige of
office for advancing the private interests of others.83
B. Case Law and Analysis
A judge may not lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance
the judge's own private interests or those of the judge's employees,'
friends," or former clients.8 6 Judges damage the public's confidence
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2B, at paragraph 1 (1994). Iowa omits this
paragraph from its Commentary. IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon
2B (1995). Kansas has modified the last sentence to read "judicial letterhead must not be used
for non-official matters of any kind." KANSAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary
to Canon 2B, at paragraph 2 (1995).
The ABA failed to include the following sentence, which was located at the end of the
first paragraph of the draft Commentary: "The use of judicial staff and appurtenances of
judicial office for personal business should never conflict with court business and should be
kept to a minimum." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 8 (Discussion Draft 1989).
83. A judge must avoid lending the prestige of judicial office for the advancement
of the private interests of others. For example, a judge must not use the judge's
judicial position to gain advantage in a civil suit involving a member of the judge's
family. In contracts for publication of a judge's writings, a judge should retain
control over the advertising to avoid exploitation of the judge's office. As to the
acceptance of awards, see Section 4D(5)(a) and Commentary.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2B, at paragraph 2 (1990).
Delaware changes the mandatory "must" in the first sentence to "should" and changes
"advancement of the private interests of others" to include "the judge or others." Delaware
also changes the second sentence from "civil suit involving a member of the judge's family"
to "litigation involving a friend or member of the judge's family." The last sentence of the
paragraph of Model Code Commentary is omitted from Delaware's version. DELAWARE
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2B, at paragraph 2 (1995).
84. See, e.g., In re Cornelius, 436 S.E.2d 836 (N.C. 1993) (censure for assisting county
employee in job dispute); Inquiry Relating to Alvord, 847 P.2d 1310, 1312-13 (Kan. 1993)
(censure, in part for calling prosecutor on behalf of clerk about traffic ticket); Matter of
Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 654 (Wash. 1987), opinion amended, 744 P.2d 340 (Wash. 1987)
(removal order, in part because judge tried to influence probation department director to
promote judge's lover, who worked in director's department); Matter of Hendrix, 701 P.2d 841,
844 (Ariz. 1985) (censure, in part because gave clerk special privileges for jail visitation and
telephone usage); Gubler v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 688 P.2d 551 (Cal. 1984)
(censure, in part because judge approved series of confiscated gun sales to bailiff).
85. See, e.g., Matter of Goodman, 649 N.E.2d 115 (Ind. 1995) (public reprimand;
perception that court's hiring and business practices were based upon exchange of favors);
Judicial Inquiry and Review Board v. Fink, 532 A.2d 358, 366 (Pa. 1987) (removal ordered,
in part due to judge lobbying prosecutor not to prosecute judge's personal friends; "likely to
be little public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the judiciary ... when one of its
judges openly and brazenly attempts to influence the decision as to whether his friends will
be prosecuted").
86. See, e.g., Matter of Ward, 448 S.E.2d 546 (S.C. 1994) (public reprimand for judge
who improperly issued arrest warrants for cold checks at request of former client engaged in
illegal loan business); Matter of Santini, 597 A.2d 1388, 1390-92 (NJ. 1991) (public reprimand
for calling public official on behalf of former client); Matter of Peeples, 374 S.E.2d 674, 677
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in the judiciary by using their office to procure personal benefit. For
example, in Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance,87 the
California Supreme Court upheld a state commission's finding that a
judge actively solicited a favorable transaction from a litigant while the
latter's case was pending in the judge's court. Shortly after awarding a
$5 million dollar judgment in favor of the litigant and while the judge
retained jurisdiction of the case pending appeal, the judge contacted the
litigant and purchased a car from the litigant at an unduly favorable
price. The California court observed:
Seeking out and accepting a favorable transaction under these
circumstances clearly would denote a lack of integrity, as well as
corruption and conduct contrary to the moral standards required
of the judicial office. Readily inferable from these allegations is
that the judge was attempting to receive favors for past deeds,
purposefully taking advantage of the power and prestige of his
judicial office, and wrongfully using his office to procure a benefit
for himself.8
Canon 2B issues also abound when a judge uses the judicial office to
advance the private interests of others. For example, a judge may
violate Canon 2B by recommending to someone that a relative/attorney
(S.C. 1988) (judge made calls and wrote letter to collect money due former client; public
reprimand for that and other misconduct).
Part-time judges have also been disciplined for using the prestige of office to assist their
current clients. See, e.g., In re Soileau, 502 So. 2d 1083, 1087-88 (La. 1987) (judge issued
warrant for non-support against opponent of judge's current divorce client). According to the
court:
Such conduct could lead a reasonable person to believe that the judge's client filed
the non-support charge on the judge's advice relating to the civil litigation and that
the judge acted in furtherance of his client's interest by causing the arrest of the
judge's adversary in the related litigation. A lay person also might reasonably infer
that the lesson to be learned was that it is better to have the judge as your advocate
(rather than your opponent) in marital litigation if there is a possibility of criminal
prosecution for failure to perform marital obligations.
Id. at 1088 n. 5. See Matter of Johnson, 568 P.2d 855, 866 (Wyo. 1977) (insufficient evidence
that part-time judge told police officer to arrest person who had stolen property from judge's
client). See also Goldstein v. Bartlett, 401 N.Y.S.2d 706, 710 (1978) (Canon 2B relied upon
to uphold rule restricting court employees from engaging in the practice of law).
87. 882 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1994).
88. Id. at 379. The Canon 2B prohibition may also apply to abuse of the office's prestige
in order to advance a less tangible, but equally important, self-interest. Due to prior political
and legislative activities, a judge may have become identified with a strong policy position on
an issue. Should the judge rule in all cases dealing with that issue? Despite Justice Hugo
Black's public views on free speech, he continued to sit on first amendment cases. As the
Canon 2B Commentary suggests, a judge must learn to "distinguish between proper and
improper use of the prestige of the office." See Rehnquist, supra note 20, at 708-713.
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of the judge be hired to handle a matter. In re Chaisson89 included a
finding that a judge improperly had played a role in the retention of the
judge's attorney/son by an acquaintance. When the judge was asked by
the person whether his son could handle a matter, the judge answered
affirmatively. The judge also suggested, alternatively, that his son could
associate with another attorney who could handle the matter. In
reversing the Judiciary Commission's conclusion that an ethical violation
had occurred, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the judge's
response and suggestion did not rise to the level of misconduct; if the
judge had urged the person to hire his son or recommend his son's
services, a violation would have occurred.9"
A judge cannot suggest or permit others to imply or insinuate that
they can influence the judge. For example, a judge should not advise a
pro se party about possible defenses to a plaintiff's complaint. To do so
transforms the judge from a judge to an advocate, favoring one party to
the detriment of the other.9' Or, if an attorney belatedly hires co-
counsel merely because the latter is a good friend of the judge, the judge
should not permit the co-counsel to participate in the case.92 A less
obvious example of an ethical violation occurred in Matter of Fuchs-
berg,93 in which a judge improperly94 obtained advice and assistance
from law professors in at least a dozen cases pending before the court.
89. 549 So. 2d 259 (La. 1989).
90. "The position of judge with children practicing law is a difficult one, particularly in
a small community. He may not use his position to solicit legal work for them, but the Code
does not require him to actively discourage potential clients." Id. at 264-65. The court also
found that the judge's judicial conduct or judgment was not involved; the implication is that
when he responded to the third party he was not acting in his judicial capacity.
Judge Chaisson was censured, inter alia, for violating Canon 2B in the same matter
because of the appearance that he lent the prestige of judicial office to advance the private
interest of the acquaintance who had filed a lawsuit against the state. The judge checked with
the governor's executive counsel on the status of settlement negotiations between the
acquaintance and the state. Although there was no proof that the judge actually influenced
the settlement, the court concluded that the judge's role created an appearance of impropriety.
A non-judge probably would not have been able to gain access to the details of settlement
negotiations. Moreover, "the matter settled on terms favorable to [the acquaintance] shortly
after [the judge's private] involvement." Id. at 263.
91. See, e.g., Swenson v. Dittner, 439 A.2d 334, 338-39 (Conn. 1981).
92. Jo~selson v. Josselson, 557 N.E.2d 835, 844 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988), appeal dismissed,
535 N.E.2d 305 (Ohio 1989). Similarly, a judge cannot accept money from potential parties
in the judge's court. See Matter of Cunningham, 538 A.2d 473, 486-87 (Pa.), appeal dismissed,
White v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Board of Pennsylvania, 488 U.S. 805 (1988).
93. 426 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1978).
94. Advice from an outside expert is proper under Canon 3B(7)(b) [3A(4) under the
1972 Code] when the judge notifies the parties about the consultation and the substance of the
advice, followed by an opportunity for the parties to respond.
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In particular, the judge took substantial portions of the professors' drafts
and published them under his own name. The judge also provided the
law professors with unpublished draft opinions of other judges without
permission. The New York Court on the Judiciary rejected the judge's
characterization of the law professors as "ad hoc" law clerks for the
judge, and found that "[t]he substantial incorporation of outside experts'
language in a Judge's opinion suggests, without more, that the expert is
influencing the decision-making process."'95
VI. A JUDGE'S TESTIMONY AS A CHARACTER WITNESS
A. The Code and Its Commentary
A specific example of a judge using the prestige of the office to
benefit another is Canon 2B's prohibition on voluntary character
testimony. The concluding sentence of Canon 2B states: "A judge shall
not testify voluntarily as a character witness. 9 6  Some states have
modified this standard to define more explicitly the circumstances in
which character witness testimony is banned,97 or is subject to excep-
tion.9
Whether and when a judge may provide a letter of recommendation
is the subject of the third paragraph of the 1990 Commentary:
95. Fuchsberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 648. The court believed the judge's claim that he arrived
at his conclusions in each case independent of the professors' drafts and used their language
simply because it reflected his own views. But the court stated that it was concerned with the
appearance which that practice created. Id.
96. The third sentence of Canon 2B of the 1972 Code provides: "He should not testify
voluntarily as a character witness." Italics indicate language in the 1972 Code that is different
from the 1990 Code.
97. Alabama prohibits such testimony "at any other hearing before any court, or judicial
or governmental commission." ALABAMA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 2C (1990).
New Jersey and Virginia omit the word "voluntarily" so that a judge cannot testify as a
character witness under any circumstance. NEW JERSEY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
2B (1994); VA. SUP. Cr. R. pt. 6 § III, CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (1994).
98. In Utah, a judge "may provide honest references in the regular course of business
or social life." UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (1994). Similarly, Michigan's
Canon 2D states that "[a] judge may respond to requests for personal references." MICHIGAN
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2D (1994). In Oregon, a judge may testify as a
character witness "pursuant to subpoena." OREGON CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Judicial
Rule 1-101(G) (1996). California's code refers to an exception for subpoena in its
Commentary. CALIFORNIA CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Commentary to Canon 2B (1996).
Idaho expands the subject of a judge's testimony to include any proceeding in which the
judge can testify: a judge may testify as a witness (not merely as a character witness) in a
proceeding involving the judge personally or in response to an official summons. IDAHO CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (1976).
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Although a judge should be sensitive to possible abuse of the
prestige of office, a judge may, based on the judge's personal
knowledge, serve as a reference or provide a letter of recommen-
dation. However, a judge must not initiate the communication of
information to a sentencing judge or a probation or corrections
officer but may provide to such persons information for the
record in response to a formal request.99
The first sentence differs from the draft language submitted to the ABA
in 1989. Although the draft language is ambiguous, it would have
limited a judge to providing a letter of recommendation for a lawyer
only if the requesting individual was a member of the judge's family or
a current or past employee of the court. Otherwise, instead of writing
a letter of recommendation, the draft permitted the judge to use "the
judge's name as a reference or respond to a request for a personal
recommendation or reference when solicited by a selection authority
such as a prospective employer, judicial selection committee, or law
school admissions office.""
The 1990 Commentary's fifth paragraph also addresses the role of the
judge serving as a reference or character witness for others. A judge
99. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2B, at paragraph 3
(1990).
The 1972 Commentary states the following concerning the issue of a judge testifying as
a character witness: "The testimony of a judge as a character witness injects the prestige of
his office into the proceeding in which he testifies and may be misunderstood to be an official
testimonial. This Canon, however, does not afford him a privilege against testifying in
response to an official summons." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to
Canon 2, at paragraph 2 (1972).
Kansas and New Mexico do not include the second sentence in their Codes. KANSAS
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2B, at paragraph 3 (1995); N.M. Sup.
CT. R. 1986, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 21-200B, at paragraph 3
(1995). The Delaware Code changes the second sentence to state that the judge should not
initiate the communication "[e]xcept in the course of the judge's official duties." DELAWARE
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2B, at paragraph 3 (1995). Arkansas
added the following sentence to its commentary: "Letters of recommendation may be written
on judicial stationery based on personal knowledge of the applicant, but not merely for the
purpose of lending the prestige of the judicial office to the applicant." ARKANSAS CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2B. California moved the second sentence from
the Commentary to the Code. CALIFORNIA CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 2B(2) (1996).
On the theory that it improperly constitutes lending the prestige of judicial office to
advance the private interests of others, the Florida Supreme Court recently prohibited judges
from writing character witness letters for any individual on official court stationery. In re
Fogan, 646 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1994) (public reprimand for writing character reference letter on
official court stationery for personal friend); In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 632 So. 2d 600,
601 (Fla. 1994). Accord, Inquiry Concerning Stafford, 643 So. 2d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 1994)
(public reprimand).
100. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 9 (Discussion Draft 1989).
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must not testify voluntarily as a character witness because to do so may
lend the prestige of the judicial office in support of the party for whom
the judge testifies. When a judge testifies as a witness, a lawyer who
regularly appears before the judge may be placed in the awkward
position of cross-examining the judge. A judge may, however, testify
when properly summoned. Except in unusual circumstances where the
demands of justice require, a judge should discourage a party from
requiring the judge to testify as a character witness. 0'
B. Case Law and Analysis
While Canon 2 only specifically restricts judges from testifying as
character witnesses, the underlying principle applies to all judicial
testimony. When a judge testifies, there is concern that the judge not
only is presenting evidence, but also is conferring the prestige and
credibility of judicial office on a litigant's position. The judge's
testimony may influence the factfinder, and the judge also appears to be
"taking sides" in the dispute."° The concern is not with the competen-
101. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUc" Commentary to Canon 2B, at paragraph 5
(1990). Paragraph five is substantially identical to the draft language of the Commentary.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr 9 (Discussion Draft 1989). New Mexico explains that
"such testimony may be misunderstood to be an official testimonial." N.M. Sup. CT. R. 1986,
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Commentary to Canon 21-200B, at paragraph 5 (1995).
The fourth paragraph of the Commentary permits the judge to serve in the process ofjudicial selection. "Judges may participate in the process of judicial selection by cooperating
with appointing authorities and screening committees seeking names for consideration, and by
responding to official inquiries concerning a person being considered for a judgeship. See also
Canon 5 regarding use of a judge's name in political activities." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCr Commentary to Canon 2B, at paragraph 4 (1990). As adopted by the ABA, the
language of this paragraph omitted the following sentence of the draft Commentary:
"However, a judge must not directly or indirectly furnish to a candidate a copy of a
recommendation written by the judge or disclose its contents to the candidate." MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 9 (Discussion Draft 1989).
102. Joachim v. Chambers, 815 S.W.2d 234, 238-39 (Tex. 1991) (Canon 2 precluded
retired judge from testifying as expert witness); State v. Grimes, 561 A.2d 647, 649 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. App. Div. 1989), cerL denied, 570 A.2d 976 (NJ. 1989) (judge's opinion testimony on local
law inadmissible). Judicial testimony is excluded on various grounds. See United States v.
Dowdy, 440 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Va. 1977) (mental processes used in formulating decision are
inadmissible); Standard Packaging Corp. v. Curwood, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. II1. 1973)
(same); Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 511,527-28 (1973) (too prejudicial to permit
a judge to testify for one party).
Nevertheless, courts have selectively recognized the propriety of judicial testimony when
the judge has either personal knowledge of a factual matter litigated before the judge or a
firsthand impression of a witness in a trial over which the judge presided. See, e.g., State v.
Kelly, 312 A.2d 906 (Vt. 1973) (judge may be compelled to testify concerning the credibility
of police officer); Jolly v. State, 269 So. 2d 650 (Miss. 1972) (judge called to relate testimony
of witness in original proceeding who has since become mentally incapacitated); State ex reL
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cy of the judge to testify; it is with the propriety of a judge's testifying.
A judge may assume the witness chair like anyone else, but he
does not so easily lay aside robe and gavel. His testimony about
a person's character may appear to be more than mere opinion
and may be mistaken for a judicial pronouncement.... The risk
of confusion of the roles of witness and judge when the same
person acts as both can create an appearance of impropriety."°
Attempts to present character testimony from judges occur during
judicial proceedings presided over by another judge or as part of a
disciplinary matter brought against an attorney or another judge.
Although a judge must respond to a subpoena, the practice of judges
appearing as character witnesses is discouraged."m Indeed, a court may
refuse to consider such testimony even if a subpoena issues for the
judge. 5 When subpoenaed, the prudent course appears to be to
disallow a judge's character testimony if other character witnesses can
provide similar testimony.
Courts also use Canon 2B as a guideline for handling other judicial
testimony." Some view expert testimony by a judge on the applicable
Childs v. Hayward, 248 A.2d 88 (N.H. 1968); People v. Drake, 841 P.2d 364, 368 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1992) (no plain error for admission of judicial testimony about uncontested matters,
although testimony at perjury trial about defendant's demeanor at first trial was irrelevant);
DeForest v. DeForest, 694 P.2d 1241 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (judge testified to prove rendition
and terms of a judgment).
103. Joachim, 815 S.W.2d at 237-38.
104. The Florida Supreme Court recently prohibited any judge from testifying as a
character witness in any proceeding except in response to a subpoena. In re Inquiry
Concerning a Judge, 632 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. 1994); See People v. Tippett, 733 P.2d 1183
(Colo. 1987) (case remanded to determine whether judge testified voluntarily about character
of defendant); State v. Schechter, 339 N.E.2d 654 (Ohio 1975) (pre-Code character testimony
by judges about prosecution witness was not illegal, unethical, unfair, or prejudicially
erroneous, but it was unwise).
105. In re Thomason, 304 S.E.2d 821, 823 (S.C. 1983) (attorneys' disciplinary body
ordered to stop issuing subpoenas for judges as character witnesses). See People v. Morley,
725 P.2d 510, 518 n.3 (Colo. 1986) (exceptional circumstances may make it appropriate for
judge to testify in attorney disciplinary proceedings). See also Florida Bar v. Prior, 330 So. 2d
697 (Fla. 1976) (character letters from judges in a disciplinary proceedings are not proper
evidence because of the inability to cross-examine and rebut the evidence).
Part-time judges may also run afoul of Canon 2B when they write letters on behalf of
clients to further the personal and private purposes of their clients. See, e.g., Matter of
Murray, 458 A.2d 116, 118 (N.J. 1983) (judge reprimanded for writing letter on behalf of
clients); Matter of Anastasi, 388 A.2d 620, 622 (N.J. 1978) (same).
106. Although Canon 2 explicitly refers to a prohibition on judges acting as character
witnesses, it may be argued that a judge may testify as an expert under certain circumstances.
For example, Canon 3(A)(8) of the Code prohibits a judge from public comment only about
pending or impending proceedings that may come before the judge's court. Further, Rule 605
of the Federal Rules of Evidenice makes a judge incompetent to testify at a trial in which he
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law of the forum, even if accurate, as inherently prejudicial."W As
indicated by the 1972 Commentary to Canon 2B, the judge's testimony
may be understood as an official testimonial, create the impression that
a judge is siding with one of the litigants in the proceeding, and receive
undue weight from the jury. s Moreover, an attorney should not have
to balance the need for zealous cross-examination against the desire not
to antagonize a judge who may preside in the attorney's future cases."
VII. A JUDGE'S MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS PRACTICING
INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION
A. The Code and Its Commentary
Until 1984, the ABA did not directly address the issue of judicial
membership in private restricted organizations. Because the Code did
not prohibit attorneys or judges from belonging to such organizations,
the implication was that membership was permissible. In 1984, as a
result of concerns that judicial participation in private club membership
casts doubt on the judge's ability to rule impartially and does not
advance the public's confidence in the judiciary's impartiality, the
or she is presiding.
107. State v. Grimes, 561 A.2d 647, 649 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Helmbrecht
v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 132 (Wis. App. 1983), affd in part/rev'd in part on other
grounds, 362 N.W.2d 118 (Wis. 1985). However, if no substitute for a judicial witness exists,
it may be possible to minimize the Canon 2 problems by not disclosing to the jury the fact that
the witness is a judge. Joachim, 815 S.W.2d at 239.
108. State v. Grimes, 561 A.2d at 649; Phillips v. Clancy, 733 P.2d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986); Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 528 (1973).
109. Joachim, 815 S.W.2d at 240.
Judicial testimony has been sought in legal malpractice cases where one of the elements
to be proved is that, but for counsel's negligence, the aggrieved party would have prevailed
on the underlying claim. In Phillips v. Clancy, 733 P.2d 300, 305 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), after
noting the prejudicial impact of judicial expert testimony, the court found that it would be
"simply impractical, inefficient and unworkable to expect judges to testify how they would
have ruled in the underlying case had the attorney not been negligent." Id.
To allow evidence of what the trial judge would have done would also open the door to
allowing the jury to be reconvened as witnesses to testify how it would have decided the
original action if the case had been properly presented. Cornett v. Johnson, 571 N.E.2d 572,
575 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (judge should not have testified). See Carey and Emmings, Ltd. v.
Ludowese, 434 N.W.2d 483,485 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (Foley, J., concurring specially) (judge
lent prestige of office to advance private interest of another when he filed affidavit indicating
how he would have ruled had certain evidence been submitted to him at the underlying
action).
In K & K Management, Inc. v. Lee, 557 A.2d 965, 972 (Md. App. 1989), a judge was
permitted to testify as an expert because he had been retained as an expert prior to
appointment as a judge.
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American Bar Association added the following paragraph to the Code's
Commentary for Canon 2:
It is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any
organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis
of race, sex, religion, or national origin. Membership of a judge
in an organization that practices invidious discrimination may give
rise to perceptions by minorities, women, and others, that the
judge's impartiality is impaired. Whether an organization
practices invidious discrimination is often a complex question to
which judges should be sensitive. The answer cannot be deter-
mined by a mere examination of an organization's current
membership rolls but rather depends upon the history of the
organization's selection of members and other relevant factors.
Ultimately, each judge must determine in the judge's own
conscience whether an organization of which the judge is a
member practices invidious discrimination."'
The 1984 ABA addition took a cautious approach to the issue by
including it in Canon 2's Commentary rather than its black-letter
standards. The 1984 Commentary also did not require a judge to choose
between the judgeship or the organizational membership, but left the
decision on the issue to "the judge's own conscience." Judges, then,
were free to belong to discriminatory organizations. After 1984, though,
those judges who maintained their memberships appeared to engage in
even more purposeful discrimination for disregarding the idea that
membership was inappropriate."'
In 1990, the ABA added Canon 2C to the black-letter language of
Canon 2. It elevates from the earlier Commentary to black-letter status
the impropriety of membership by a judge in certain organizations. The
addition of Canon 2C provided an important principle to eliminate
negative perceptions about whether a judge's private affiliations could
affect the judge's decisionmaking. Canon 2C states: "A judge shall not
hold membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimina-
110. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Commentary to Canon 2, at paragraph 3
(1984). The fact that attorneys still are not prohibited from joining these organizations again
suggests current differences in defining permissible conduct by lawyers and judges.
111. See Steven Lubet, Judicial Ethics and Private Lives, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 983, 1004
(1985).
More than a dozen states that ratified other portions of the 1972 Commentary never
ratified the 1984 addition to the Commentary, meaning that more than half the states (by
including those states that have not adopted any Canon 2 Commentary) have no statement
about the suitability of membership in such organizations.
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tion on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin.""' 2
As written, Canon 2C provides a strict liability standard: a judge may
be in violation even in the absence of knowledge about the membership
or the fact that the organization practices invidious discrimination.13
Moreover, the governing criterion is invidious, rather than illegal,
discrimination. "Invidious" discrimination arguably is broader than
discrimination that is unlawful under federal or state law."4
112. Michigan phrases the concern of Canon 2C differently in its Canon 2E: "A judge
should be particularly cautious with regard to membership activities that discriminate, or
appear to discriminate, on the basis of race, gender, or other protected personal characteris-
tic." MICHIGAN CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 2E (1994).
Delaware, Georgia, Virginia, and Washington use the verb "should" rather than "shall."
DELAWARE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2C (1995); GEORGIA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 2C (1994); VA. Sup. CT. R. pt. 6 § tit. III, CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 2C (1994); WA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2C (1992). Colorado substitutes
the term "gender" for "sex." COLORADO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2C (1990 &
Supp. 1993).
Florida adds the following sentence to Canon 2C: "Membership in a fraternal, sororal,
religious, or ethnic heritage organization shall not be deemed a violation of this provision."
FLORIDA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2C (1995). The following states also add an
exemption for membership in a religious organization: California, Michigan, Utah, and West
Virginia. CALIFORNIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2C (1994); MICHIGAN CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2E (1994); UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2C (1994);
WEST VIRGINIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2C (1994). West Virginia also exempts
memberships in organizations that are (1) dedicated to the preservation of ethnic, historical
or cultural values that are of legitimate common interest to their members; or (2) an intimate,
distinctly private association of persons whose membership limitations would be entitled to
constitutional protection. WEST VIRGINIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2C (1994).
California also exempts memberships in official military organizations of the United States.
CALIFORNIA CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 2C (1996).
Georgia does not specify bases for discrimination, but instead ends the standard after the
term "invidious discrimination." GEORGIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2C (1994).
New Mexico prefaces Canon 2C with the heading "Membership in Organizations." N.M.
SUP. CT. R. 1986, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 21-200C (1995).
113. Colorado, Iowa, and Oregon require that the judge "know" that the organization
practices invidious discrimination. COLORADO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2C (1990
& Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2C (1995); OREGON CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Judicial Rule 1-101(H) (1996). Texas requires that the judge knowingly
hold the prohibited membership. TEXAS RULES OF COURT, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 2C (West 1994).
114. Maine and Minnesota substitute the term "unlawful discrimination" for "invidious
discrimination." MAINE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2C (1994); MINNESOTA CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2C (1996). Oregon describes a discriminatory organization as
one that discriminates "as a policy or practice and contrary to applicable federal or state law
.... " OREGON CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Judicial Rule 1-101(H) (1996). Washington
provides that a judge "should not hold membership in any organization practicing
discrimination prohibited by law." WASHINGTON CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2C
(1995).
Discrimination based upon criteria other than those listed in Canon 2C is illegal, e.g.,
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The 1990 Commentary for Canon 2C contains three paragraphs of
explanation and definition. 15 The first paragraph reiterates the
appearance of partiality problems when a judge belongs to an organiza-
tion that currently practices invidious discrimination. While it offers
factors to assist in the difficult task of determining whether an organiza-
tion engages in such practices, the Commentary also allows membership
in groups that discriminate on the basis of religion or ethnic background. 6
discrimination based upon disability. Rhode Island added "disability" to Canon 2C as a
prohibited type of discrimination. R.I. Sup. Cr. R. art. VI, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr
Canon 2C (1994).
California added "sexual orientation" to its Canon 2C as a prohibited basis for
discrimination. CALIFORNIA CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHIcs Canon 2C (1996).
Oregon prohibits knowing membership in a "discriminatory organization," which is
defined to include persons who are treated "less favorably in granting membership privileges,
allowing participation or providing services," on the basis of, inter alia, "sexual orientation,
marital status, disability or age." OREGON CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Judicial Rule 1-
101(H) (1996).
115. California, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Wyoming have adopted
the Canon 2C Commentary verbatim or in substantially the same form as the ABA Code.
The following states adopting the 1990 language (or variations) of Canon 2C have not adopted
any of the Commentary: Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, Texas,
Utah, and Washington.
Florida adds a paragraph at the beginning of the Canon 2C Commentary: "Florida Canon
2C is derived from a recommendation by the American Bar Association and from the United
States Senate Committee Resolution, 101st Congress, Second Session, as adopted by the
United States Senate Judiciary Committee on August 2, 1990." FLORIDA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 1 (1995).
116. Membership of a judge in an organization that practices invidious discrimina-
tion gives rise to perceptions that the judge's impartiality is impaired. Section 2C
refers to the current practices of the organization. Whether an organization practices
invidious discrimination is often a complex question to which judges should be
sensitive. The answer cannot be determined from a mere examination of an organi-
zation's current membership rolls but rather depends on how the organization selects
members and other relevant factors, such as that the organization is dedicated to the
preservation of religious, ethnic or cultural values of legitimate common interest to
its members, or that it is in fact and effect an intimate, purely private organization
whose membership limitations could not be constitutionally prohibited. Absent such
factors, an organization is generally said to discriminate invidiously if it arbitrarily
excludes from membership on the basis of race, religion, sex or national origin
persons who would otherwise be admitted to membership. See New York State Club
Ass'n. Inc. v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225... (1988); Board of Directors of
Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537... (1987); Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 ... (1984).
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 2 (1990).
Florida omits the second sentence from its Commentary. FLORIDA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 2 (1995). In addition, the following is
included after the Florida Commentary's case cites:
Other relevant factors include the size and nature of the organization and the
diversity of persons in the locale who might reasonably be considered potential
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The concluding paragraphs of the Canon 2C Commentary were not
part of the Commentary submitted to the ABA in 1989 by its Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. The second
paragraph of the Canon 2C Commentary expands the prohibition beyond
membership in such an organization to a judge who arranges a meeting
or regularly uses the organization's facilities."7 The final paragraph
members. Thus the mere absence of diverse membership does not by itself
demonstrate a violation unless reasonable persons with knowledge of all the relevant
circumstances would expect that the membership would be diverse in the absence of
invidious discrimination.
Id.
In addition to those factors cited in the ABA Commentary, Delaware and North Dakota
cite other relevant factors, such as the size and nature of the organization as well as the
diversity of persons in the locale who might reasonably be considered potential members.
DELAWARE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 1 (1995);
NORTH DAKOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 1
(1994). The North Dakota Commentary continues: "Thus the mere absence of diverse
membership does not by itself demonstrate a violation unless reasonable persons with
knowledge of all the relevant circumstances would expect that the membership would be
diverse in the absence of invidious discrimination." Id.
South Dakota's Commentary elaborates on which groups cannot be said to discriminate.
"Organizations dedicated to the preservation of religious, fraternal, sororal, spiritual,
charitable, civic, or cultural values, which do not stigmatize any excluded persons as inferior
and therefore unworthy of membership, are not considered to discriminate invidiously."
SOUTH DAKOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 2
(1994).
West Virginia's Commentary completes the thought in the ABA Commentary's first
sentence by adding that the judge's impartiality is impaired "because of the appearance of
judicial bias against persons excluded from membership." WEST VIRGINIA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 1 (1994).
Georgia's first paragraph of Commentary ends with the following: "Ultimately, each judge
must determine in the judge's own conscience whether an organization of which the judge is
a member practices invidious discrimination." GEORGIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 1 (1994). This language was offered to the ABA as
an alternative in the draft submitted in 1989. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 10
(Discussion Draft 1989).
Arkansas does not enumerate the factors at the end of the fourth sentence, and its
Commentary omits the citations. ARKANSAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to
Canon 2C, at paragraph 1 (1994).
New Jersey's Canon 2C Commentary contains only one sentence, which is a variation on
the ABA Code's fourth sentence of the first paragraph. "Organizations dedicated to the
preservation of religious, spiritual, charitable, civic or cultural values, that do not stigmatize
any excluded persons as inferior and therefore unworthy of membership are not considered
to discriminate invidiously." NEW JERSEY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to
Canon 2C (1994).
117. Although Section 2C relates only to membership in organizations that
invidiously discriminate on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin, a judge's
membership in an organization that engages in any discriminatory membership
practices prohibited by the law of the jurisdiction also violates Canon 2 and Section
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requires a judge/member of such an organization to resign, but the judge
may first make efforts to persuade the organization to discontinue its
practices."8
2A and gives the appearance of impropriety. In addition, it would be a violation of
Canon 2 and Section 2A for a judge to arrange a meeting at a club that the judge
knows practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or national
origin in its membership or other policies, or for the judge to regularly use such a
club. Moreover, public manifestation by a judge of the judge's knowing approval of
invidious discrimination on any basis gives the appearance of impropriety under
Canon 2 and diminishes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, in violation of Section 2A.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 2 (1990). New
Mexico omits the first sentence from its Commentary. N.M. SUP. Cr. R. 1986, CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 21-200C, at paragraph 2 (1995).
Arizona's Commentary omits the reference in the second sentence to examples of
invidious discrimination. ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 81, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary
to Canon 2C, at paragraph 2 (1993). North Dakota omits the last phrase of the second sen-
tence. NORTH DAKOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at
paragraph 2 (1994).
Georgia omits this paragraph from its Commentary. Florida specifically exempts
membership in religious and ethnic.clubs, such as Knights of Columbus, Masons, B'nai B'rith,
and Sons of Italy; civic organizations, such as Rotary, Kiwanis, and The Junior League; young
people's organizations, such as Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Boy's Clubs, and Girl's Clubs; and
charitable organizations, such as United Way and Red Cross. FLORIDA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 3 (1995).
Despite its prohibition on memberships in organizations that discriminate based upon
"sex" and "sexual orientation," California's Canon 2C does not "bar membership in a
nonprofit youth organization" such as the Girl Scouts of America or Boy Scouts of America,
as long as the membership does not violate Canon 4A (dealing with extrajudicial activities in
general). CALIFORNIA CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 2C (1996). A "nonprofit youth
organization" is:
any nonprofit corporation or association not organized for private gain of any person, and
one whose purposes are irrevocably dedicated to benefiting and serving the interests of
minors, and which maintains its nonprofit status in accordance with applicable state and
federal tax laws.
Id. at Section on Terminology.
118. When a person who is ajudge on the date this Code becomes effective [in the
jurisdiction in which the person is a judge] learns that an organization to which the
judge belongs engages in invidious discrimination that would preclude membership
under Section 2C or under Canon 2 and Section 2A, the judge is permitted, in lieu
of resigning, to make immediate efforts to have the organization discontinue its
invidiously discriminatory practices, but is required to suspend participation in any
other activities of the organization. If the organization fails to discontinue its
invidiously discriminatory practices as promptly as possible (and in all events within
a year of the judge's first learning of the practices), the judge is required to resign
immediately from the organization.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 3 (1990).
Delaware, Maryland, and North Dakota expand the time limitation for mandatory
resignation from one to two years. DELAWARE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary
to Canon 2C, at paragraph 3 (1995); MD. CT. R. 1231, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
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B. Case Law and Analysis
Although as of early 1996 no judicial decisions have applied or
interpreted Canon 2C, several judicial ethics advisory committee opinions
have discussed its scope and meaning. Canon 2C applies to organiza-
tions such as service or professional organizations and country clubs with
more or less constant memberships controlled by some type of approval
policy. The groups meet for professional, social, recreational, charitable,
educational, or civic purposes. A Canon 2C group offers membership
benefits beyond interaction with other members, e.g., recreation,
opportunities for education, community involvement, or professional or
business advancement.11 9 The stated reason for Canon 2C is that
discriminatory clubs symbolize inequality, and therefore membership in
a group that practices invidious discrimination invites questions about the
judge's commitment to equality and fairness. A judge's membership in
such a group contributes to the perpetuation of unequal opportuni-
Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 3 (1994); NORTH DAKOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 3 (1994).
Delaware and Indiana do not require the judge to suspend participation in other activities
while attempting to persuade the organization to discontinue its discriminatory activities.
DELAWARE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 3 (1995);
INDIANA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 3 (1994).
The Delaware Commentary also states that the judge "should" rather than "shall" resign
immediately. In addition, the judge should make both immediate and continuous efforts to
have the organization discontinue its discriminatory practices. DELAWARE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 3 (1995).
California and Georgia omit this paragraph from their Commentary. Arizona replaces
the third paragraph with a simple statement that a judge must resign from the organization
within one year of the inception of judicial service. ARIz. SUP. CT. R. 81, CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 3 (1993). Nebraska's Commentary
demands that a judicial candidate is deemed to be on notice of the Code's requirements, and,
if successful, the person must resign from the discriminatory organization before assuming
office. NEBRASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 4
(1992).
No state that has adopted Canon 2C and its Commentary has adopted the bracketed
portion of the third paragraph.
119. As long as a facility is a place where clients may visit, the relative modesty of the
facility "probably" does not affect the applicability of Canon 2C. Indiana Commission on
Judicial Qualifications, Advisory Opinion 1-94, n.4.
1996]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ties"z still encountered by minorities in commerce, corporations,
professions, and business.
Generally, the judicial ethics opinions apply a three-part analysis for
Canon 2C:
1) Does an organization discriminate on the basis of race,
national origin, religion, or gender?
2) If the organization does discriminate, is it, in the words of the
Commentary, not "in fact and effect an intimate, purely private
organization whose membership limitations could not be constitu-
tionally prohibited"?1 21
3) If the organization discriminates and is not protected as an
intimate, private group, are the discriminatory practices "invidi-
ous"?
A negative response to any of the issues requires no further inquiry. An
affirmative response to all three queries indicates that the judge should
resign or not seek membership in the organization.
1. Does the Organization Discriminate?
Whether an organization discriminates is a fact-specific question,
requiring that each judge assume the burden of gathering information in
order to assess whether membership would comply with Canon 2C.1 2
The factors frequently examined are the composition of the organiza-
tion's membership as well as statements in the group's governing
documents that suggest explicit or de facto discriminatory practices. For
example, a bylaw indicating that an organization is for the benefit or
advancement of a group is not discriminatory, but a bylaw stating that
120. In Nebraska Judicial Ethics Committee, Advisory Opinion 93-2, Judge Alan Gless
wrote a concurring opinion that questioned the reasoning of United States Judicial Conference
Advisory Opinion 934. The latter suggested that, if a group prohibited membership for
business purposes, exclusion of women from membership is proper. Judge Gless observed:
Anyone who is denied the opportunity for full membership in such organizations is
thus concomitantly denied the opportunity in that social setting to meet and work
with local leaders who can and do provide the contacts necessary to economic
success. The organization's policy may prohibit membership for business purposes
or personal advantage on paper, but cannot prevent it in reality because of the
inescapable nexus between rural social life and rural economic life.
121. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucT Commentary to Canon 2C, at paragraph 1
(1990).
122. Even if they are aware of the history, purpose, functions, tenets, and activities of
all organizations, judicial ethics commissions are unwilling to create lists of approved or disap-
proved groups. See, e.g., id. An ethics committee should refuse to accept a judge's claims
about the organization at face value. See Nebraska Judicial Ethics Committee, Advisory
Opinion 93-2 (Gless, J., concurring).
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the group is to be composed only of one group is explicitly discriminato-
ry. Although that expression could have been a drafting mistake, the
judge nevertheless should examine the application and recruitment
processes to learn more fully about the existence and extent of discrimi-
nation."
The Boy Scouts of America and Girl Scouts of America generally
restrict their respective memberships by gender. Although limited parts
of each program are open to both genders, nondiscrimination in some
segments of an organization does not make it nondiscriminatory. "When
an organization discriminates in any membership category, its discrimina-
tory practices require further analysis under Canon 2C."124
2. Is the Organization Exempt from Scrutiny Because it is Purely
Private?
As the Canon 2C Commentary states, an organization's discriminato-
ry membership limitations are exempt from government interference
when the group is "in fact and effect an intimate, purely private
organization." However, this "safe harbor" for distinctly private groups
is quite narrow, as suggested by the United States Supreme Court cases
cited in the Commentary."3 The ethics opinions merely suggest an
inquiry for distinguishing between private groups and organizations.
Besides the purpose of the group and whether membership is controlled
by some type of approval method, other factors useful to a decision
about whether an organization is distinctly private include:
[its] size, its overall selectivity in membership, whether it
advertises or publicizes its activities, whether it has subjected itself
to governmental regulation such as with a liquor license, whether
it sells retail goods or services, whether it offers its services or
facilities to non-members, or whether it has developed a public
identification such as through civic or charitable activities or
participation in public events.26
123. See, e.g., Arizona Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee, Opinion 94-13 (1994). If no
one in the excluded group has ever applied for group membership, that could support an
inference that the group does not encourage applications from individuals in that group. Id.
124. Arizona Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee, Opinion 94-7 (1994).
125. See supra note 116.
126. Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications Opinion 1-94, n.2. "Canon 2C is
aimed directly at country clubs, dining clubs, and service and professional organizations." Id.
"Canon 2C does not proscribe participation in gender-restricted activities like mother-daughter
banquets, men's support groups, college fraternity or sorority alumni groups, boy scouts, girls'
basketball, and single-sex fitness facilities." Such "participation signifies nothing untoward
about the judge's commitment to fairness and impartiality, nor are entire protected classes of
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In contrast to large, broad-based groups which are undoubtedly subject
to Canon 2C, "a few people who gather informally and periodically to
play cards are not covered."' 7
3. Is the Discrimination Invidious?
A judge's membership in an organization that discriminates and is not
"purely private" does not require further action unless the discrimination
is invidious. An invidious distinction is an arbitrary one made on an
illegitimate or offensive basis."z Membership discrimination is invidi-
ous if the reasons for the restrictions fail to reflect legitimate, generally
accepted values."2 9
When an organization engages in discriminatory practices, an
affirmative justification is necessary to support judicial membership in
the organization. Some groups exist for the legitimate purpose of
perpetuating or celebrating cultures, historical events, and ethnic or
religious identities and traditions. 3 ' Judicial ethics opinions regard
people being denied economic opportunity by the exclusions in the activities." Id. at n.3.
127. Id.
128. Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications, Advisory Opinion 1-94.
129. Id.
[A] group's interests in its membership practices are legitimate when they (1) serve
"religious, ethnic or cultural values of legitimate common interest to its members;"
(2) are not generally regarded as repugnant in contemporary society; and (3) cause
no harm to the excluded group or harm that is minimal and that is substantially
outweighed by the group's legitimate interests. However, when the harms to those
excluded - such as economic or educational disadvantage or a stigma of inferiority -
are significant, the assertion that the membership practices serve some legitimate
common interest does not render those practices acceptable.
Id.
The Commission cited the Daughters of the American Revolution, the Knights of
Columbus, and the Sons of Italy as groups with permissible membership limitations.
As the harm caused by discrimination to the excluded group increases, the organization
must increasingly justify its practices. For example, because Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts
usually engage in recreational and community service activities, excluded groups do not
experience the loss of economic opportunities. At this point the Advisory Opinion
equivocated and finessed its way past the issue of stigmatization. "If each group has legitimate
reasons for its membership policies, and if both males and females have essentially equal
opportunity to participate .. ., then no stigma of inferiority is likely to attach to children of
either gender." Id. (emphasis added).
Instead, the Commission reported that it had not probed into matters such as the relative
financial resources of the groups or the details of the activities they sponsor, and therefore it
was left to each judge to make that inquiry.
130. In 1993, the United States Judicial Conference, Advisory Opinion 934 relied upon
a 1990 United States Senate Judiciary Committee Resolution pertaining to nominees for
federal judgeships in finding that judicial membership in the Masonic Order is permissible
despite its gender membership restrictions. The Resolution expressly omitted from its category
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membership in those groups as inclusive of an entire group rather than
exclusive of certain groups. 31 A group's legitimatet32 purposes may
lead to the conclusion that its membership limitations are not unfair or
stigmatizing, but instead are closely linked to what the group seeks to
preserve or celebrate." The difficult issue appears to be assessing
of groups that practice invidious discrimination "fraternal, sororal, religious or ethnic heritage
organizations." That reliance and almost exclusive dependence upon the inquiring judge's
version of the organization's practices came under sharp attack from Judge Alan Gless in
Nebraska Judicial Ethics Committee, Opinion 93-2 (1993).
131. California Judges Association Committee on Judicial Ethics, Opinion No. 34 (1987).
132. Merely promoting group advancement or cohesion is not a legitimate basis for
exclusion. Arizona Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee, Opinion 94-13 (1994).
Suppose that victims of past invidious discrimination form or control an organization to
discriminate and to compensate for disadvantages suffered as a result of the prior discrimina-
tion. Can such discrimination be legitimate if there has been a disadvantage suffered by the
group's membership that is related to its basis for exclusion, i.e., the intent in forming or
continuing the organization is to compensate for the disadvantage? Arguably, this may be
permissible if the group's programs and policies are not based upon and do not perpetuate
stereotypical notions, and the organization's discriminatory policies and programs directly and
substantially help its members compensate for the previous disadvantage. See id.
133. Regardless of a group's preference to maintain membership segregation, each judge
should examine the goals of the group to ensure that its interests are consistent with
contemporary society. Arizona Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee, Opinion 94-7 (1994).
The opinion acknowledged the opposing views about the benefits of matters like gender
segregation and decided to refrain from determining which is correct. Instead, the Committee
stated that such groups do not foster "malicious" discrimination prohibited by Canon 2C, and
referred to the evidence that the membership practices of those groups are beneficial to the
children. Id.
The California Judges Association has addressed four cases about unidentified
international service organizations. The first involved a service club that had a bylaw
excluding women from membership without justification. The Judges Association found that
the organization discriminated invidiously and that a parallel "auxiliary" organization for wives
of members was clearly patronizing and stigmatized women as inferior. California Judges
Association Committee on Judicial Ethics, Opinion No. 34 (1987). See Nebraska Judicial
Ethics Committee, Advisory Opinion 93-2 (1993). An assessment of invidiousness may include
a determination of whether the discrimination is unlawful, i.e., illegal discrimination is
invidious. For example, the California Judges Association Opinion found that the practices
of the group that was the subject of the first inquiry violated not only Canon 2C but also the
California Civil Rights Act. California Judges Association Committee on Judicial Ethics,
Opinion No. 34, supra.
The second case approved a judge's membership in a local chapter of a similarly situated
international group when the local group had opened its membership to women though none
had joined as of the date of the opinion. In the third case, the governing documents of the
international group required membership in both a local chapter (which had admitted women
to membership) and the international parent organization (which did not admit women). The
opinion supported the judge's membership in the local chapter, finding no public perception
about the judge's impartiality due to the judge's pro forma membership in the invidiously
discriminating international group.
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which purposes are legitimate without raising concerns about fairness or
restricting public officials' private lives.
It is unlikely that judges will end their affiliations with invidiously
discriminating groups or that all organizations wil abandon their
membership policies. The necessity for applying Canon 2C, then, will
continue. For courts and judicial ethics committees, the scope of Canon
2C awaits further development, for three reasons. First, the criteria for
determining whether an organization invidiously discriminates are still
indefinite. Until there is a consensus about the appropriate technique
for Canon 2C analysis, judges cannot predict an ethics committee or
appellate decision for any group to which they belong. Of course, even
consistently applied criteria may lead to disparate conclusions from state
to state about the propriety of judicial memberships.
Second, unlike other standards in the Code of Judicial Conduct that
apply both to the judge as well as to other members of the judge's
household,TM Canon 2C applies only to the memberships held by the
judge and is therefore subject to abuse. A judicial nominee who is a
member of an organization that invidiously discriminates in violation of
Canon 2C may choose to resign the prohibited membership in order to
improve the chances of being confirmed as a judicial appointee or being
elected by the voters. Shortly after being confirmed or elected, however,
the judge's spouse rejoins the discriminatory organization in the spouse's
name. Because Canon 2C does not prohibit the judge's spouse from
belonging to a discriminatory organization, this indirect violation can
occur.
Finally, it is unclear when and who will be able to obtain relief for
violations of Canon 2C. Judicial ethics committees will attempt to
respond to inquiries about the correctness of judicial membership in
various groups, only to leave it to the individual judge to assess the
In the fourth case, the Association failed to reach a decision for a judge who belonged
to an international organization that excluded women from membership everywhere except
within California. A plurality believed that Canon 2C should apply to groups that discriminate
invidiously anywhere within the United States, while a minority believed that the judge's pro
forma membership in the international group did not affect his membership in a nondiscrimi-
natory local chapter in California.
134. See, e.g., Canon 3E(1)(c) (judge cannot sit in case when the judge, the judge's
spouse, or a minor child residing in the judge's household has a financial interest in the subject
matter or a party); Canon 3E(1)(d) (judge cannot sit in case when the judge, the judge's
spouse, and someone within the third degree of relationship to either, or the spouse of such
person, acts as a party, officer, director, or trustee of a party, a lawyer, has an interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding, or is likely to be a material
witness in the proceeding).
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circumstances of the particular case. Litigants before the judge will have
an interest in the judge's associations as well. As with other parts of
Canon 2, litigants may seek the disqualification of a judge under Canon
3E due to the judge's memberships. The losing party on a motion for
recusal would seek an appellate reversal of either a criminal conviction
or a verdict in a civil case. There also may be a standing problem in
Canon 2C litigation. Who can raise a Canon 2C problem in court?
Anyone may be able to challenge the judge's group affiliations. Perhaps
the courts will decide instead that the challenging litigant must be a
member of the group that has been excluded from the judge's organiza-
tion in order to raise a Canon 2C issue.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Canon 2 describes the circumstances in which the American Bar
Association and ratifying states have determined that a judge is
accountable for both improper conduct and the appearance of such
behavior. This Article has noted specific ways in which appellate courts
have interpreted or applied Canon 2 beyond its terms. Frequently, a
common law of judicial ethics standards evolves through judicial (and
political) reaction to an individual judge's conduct. Periodically, these
experiences have persuaded the American Bar Association and
individual states to adopt additions or modifications for the Code
language itself. Public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and its
decisionmaking process requires that public institutions regularly review
the ethical standards for judges. In that way, judges can conform their
professional and personal conduct to public expectations.
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